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ENDING THE HIGHER EDUCATION SUCKER SALE:  
TOWARD AN EXPANDED THEORY OF TORT LIABILITY 
FOR RECRUITMENT DECEPTION 
 
Aaron N. Taylor∗ 
 
Admissions officers live a dual, often conflicted, existence.  In one sense, 
they are counselors responsible for advising prospective students.  In 
another sense, they are salespeople with obligations to meet enrollment 
goals.  The pressures fostered by these roles sometimes prompt 
unscrupulous individuals to use misrepresentations and other forms of 
deception to induce students to enroll.  Unfortunately, students who are 
induced to enroll based on recruitment deception are afforded few options 
for redress.  The purpose of this article is to conceptualize a tort-based 
solution to this utter inequity.  The article proposes a broadening of 
negligent misrepresentation to encompass a new tort—negligent 
educational recruitment.  This tort would employ approaches to 
determining duty and causation that account for the distinctive nature of 
the educational process, and, thus, overcome the concerns that often doom 
negligent misrepresentation lawsuits in the higher education context.  
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The used car salesman is held out to be the ultimate swindler.  He has been 
stylized as a polyester-clad, cigar-chomping figure, with a shifty manner 
of speech and a gaudy approach to accessorizing.  In popular parlance, the 
addition of “like a used car salesman” can turn an innocuous subject-verb 
statement into an insult.  Next to politicians and lawyers, there is likely no 
more popular target of half-witted jokes and generalized scorn than the 
peddlers of pre-owned vehicles. 
 
The very nature of the car selling business nurtures these unflattering 
perceptions.  The commission-based pay structure provides clear 
incentives for advantage-taking and outright dishonesty by sellers.  
Salespeople are trained to use tactics premised on tipping the negotiation 
(to the extent that there is one) and any eventual sale in their favor.  
Buyers often approach the sale with little information and no training or 
experience in negotiating.  The most successful salespeople are those who 
are able to extract the best deal by compounding their tactical strengths 
with the buyer’s weaknesses. 
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The potential for a sucker sale is particularly acute on car lots, where sale 
prices and finance terms are subject to manipulation and product defects 
are easily hidden.  The untrained and uninformed buyer is little match for 
the astute seller whose paycheck depends on closing the deal.  As a result, 
and for good reason, buyers tend to be suspicious of car salespeople, and it 
is plausible that in some cases that suspicion yields a better deal for the 
buyer.  But imagine a setting where sellers have all the advantages 
afforded their peers in the car business, but they also enjoy an advantage 
of which most car salespeople could only dream—the buyer’s trust.  
Colleges and universities provide such settings, and admissions officers all 
too often take advantage by using deception to induce students to enroll. 
 
Unfortunately, students who are induced to enroll based on deception are 
afforded few options for redress.  The fundamental relationship between a 
student and her higher education institution is contractual in nature; 
therefore, victims of recruitment deception often bring breach of contract 
claims.1   But in order to be successful, a plaintiff’s allegations must 
pertain to specific unfulfilled promises.2  An assurance made to a 
prospective student that she would have “no problem” finding a job with a 
particular degree lacks the specificity needed to be actionable in a breach 
of contract suit, even though it could serve as a functional promise.  
 
Victims of recruitment deception often bring tort claims as well.  
Fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and 
educational malpractice are common tort theories.  Unfortunately, neither 
provides a viable path for students victimized by slick higher education 
sales tactics.  Fraudulent misrepresentation is difficult to prove because 
scienter, or intent to deceive, is difficult to prove.3  In addition, allegations 
of fraud must be alleged with a level of specificity that is often difficult to 
present.4  Negligence claims, including misrepresentation and malpractice, 
tend to fail because courts have found it “extremely difficult if not nearly 
impossible” to determine educational duty.5  They have also fashioned a 
host of “policy” justifications for dismissing educational malpractice 
claims.6   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 1992). 
2 Id. at 417. 
3 See, e.g., Hunter v. Bd. of Educ., 439 A.2d 582, 587 (Md. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 1982) 
(“Claimant will usually face a formidable burden in attempting to produce adequate 
evidence to establish the intent requirement of the tort.”). 
4 See, e.g., Jamieson v. Vatterott Educ. Ctr., Inc., 473 F.Supp 2d 1153, 1156 (D. Kan. 
2007) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, an allegation of fraud must set forth the time, 
place, and contents of the false representation, the identity of the party making the false 
statements and the consequences thereof.”). 
5 See, e.g., Sain v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 626 N.W.2d 115, 121 (Ia. Sup. Ct. 
2001). 
6 In addition to the professed absence of a duty of care, courts have cited uncertainty in 
determining causation and damages, the potential flood of litigation burdening schools, 
and the judicial deference historically afforded educational institutions.  See, e.g., id. 
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The end result is that admissions officers are allowed to make deliberate 
and convincing misrepresentations with virtual impunity.  Applicants, 
many of whom lack higher education insight and are unaware that their 
supposed admissions counselor is actually a salesperson, are left to be 
victimized, with insult added by the lack of redress for their injuries.   
 
The purpose of this article is to conceptualize a tort-based solution to this 
utter inequity.  The article proposes a broadening of negligent 
misrepresentation to encompass a new tort—negligent educational 
recruitment.  This tort would employ approaches to determining duty and 
causation that account for the distinctive nature of the educational process, 
and, thus, conceivably overcome the concerns that often doom negligence 
lawsuits. 
 
A tort-based solution is needed because contractual liability is determined 
based on assumptions that are sometimes unsuitable for application to the 
higher education context.  Contract law assumes arm’s-length 
transactions.7  In the context of higher education, however, information 
asymmetries place admissions officers and prospective students on 
unequal footing, allowing the former to exercise undue influence upon the 
latter.8  Contract law also assumes morally indifferent parties.9  But our 
enduring (though increasingly skeptical) societal encouragement of 
educational pursuits is based on a value-laden “public good” premise.10  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Michael H. Cohen, Comment: Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1291, 1306 (1985) (“In contract the 
parties voluntarily assume duties and allocate risks.”). 
8 U.S. SENATE, COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR AND PENSIONS, FOR PROFIT 
HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND 
ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS (2012), 
http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/for_profit_report/PartI-PartIII-
SelectedAppendixes.pdf  (providing extensive documentation of various unscrupulous 
tactics used by for-profit admissions officers in inducing enrollment) [Hereinafter HELP 
REPORT].  David D. Dill, Allowing the Market to Rule: The Case of the United States, 57 
HIGHER EDUC. Q. 136, 147 (2003) (“[B]ecause higher education in the US is an industry 
in which consumers cannot objectively evaluate the quality of the service before they 
purchase it, an information asymmetry can exist in which institutions may take advantage 
of consumers.”). 
9 Cohen, supra note 7 at 1313 (“Contract law presumes that parties are indifferent 
between performance and breach, that breach is morally neutral, and that expectation 
damages are adequate to make the injured party whole.”). 
10 WALTER W. MCMAHON, THE PRIVATE AND SOCIAL BENEFITS OF HIGHER EDUCATION: 
THE EVIDENCE, THEIR VALUE, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  2 (2010), http://www1.tiaa-
cref.org/ucm/groups/content/@ap_ucm_p_tcp_docs/documents/document/tiaa02029326.
pdf (“Beyond the private benefits…of higher education…there are contributions to 
democratic institutions, human rights, political stability, lower state welfare costs, lower 
health costs, lower public incarceration costs, contributions to social capital, to the 
generation of new ideas, and so forth.”)  See, also, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[Education] is required in the performance of our most basic 
public responsibilities…it is the very foundation of good citizenship.”). 
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Recognizing the shortcomings of contract law, the tort theory 
conceptualized in this article acknowledges both the special relationship 
between admissions officers and prospective students and the need for 
strong deterrents that transcend the limits of contract law. 
 
The discussion will be illustrated with a primary focus on for-profit higher 
education.  This orientation is not meant to suggest that the not-for-profit 
sector is free of improprieties.  Schools in all sectors of higher education 
face similar pressures to generate income through student enrollments, and 
allegations of unscrupulous practices transcend sectors.11  But as a general 
proposition, the pressure to increase enrollments is greater among for-
profit schools, due to their profit motive and the absence of alternative 
sources of revenue, such as public appropriations and endowments.12  As a 
result, for-profit schools have been targets of a disproportionate number of 
allegations of unscrupulous recruitment behavior, especially allegations of 
unlawful compensation arrangements for admissions officers.13  The 
distinctive aspects of the sector and the vibrancy of the critical attention it 
attracts make it particularly amenable to illustrative focus.  
 
In making the case for a tort path to redress for victims of recruitment 
deception, the article will begin, in Part I, with a discussion of how 
conflicting roles can prompt admissions officers to engage in deceptive 
behavior.  Part II describes the market in which higher education 
institutions operate and the role of marketing and recruitment.  Part III 
focuses on for-profit school marketing and recruitment practices.  Part IV 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In recent years, various colleges and universities have admitted to inflating entering 
student credentials in order to increase rankings and make their classes appear more 
competitive.  See, e.g., Beckie Supiano, Emory U. Intentionally Misreported Admissions 
Data, Investigation Finds, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Aug. 17, 2012), 
http://chronicle.com/blogs/headcount/emory-u-intentionally-misreported-admissions-
data-investigation-finds/31215.  Additionally, law schools have been the target of a series 
of lawsuits alleging, among other things, misrepresentation of outcomes data.  See, e.g., 
Paul Barrett, Glut Leads Lawyers to (Surprise) Sue Law Schools, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-03-23/glut-
leads-lawyers-to-surprise-sue-law-schools. 
12 Associate’s and certificate level for-profit schools receive 89% of their total revenue 
from tuition and fees, compared to 16% for public and 58% for private institutions.  At 
the bachelor’s degree level, 91% of for-profit revenue comes from tuition and fees, 
compared to 19% among public and 33% among private institutions.  SUSAN AUD ET 
AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2012, AT 42 (2012), 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012045.pdf.  See, also, HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 49 
(“The pressure to recruit as many students as possible starts at the top of the for-profit 
education business model. Investors…demand revenue growth.  Revenue growth requires 
enrolling a steady stream of students.”).  
13 For-profit entities were the target of 42 of the 45 most recent federal False Claims Act 
lawsuits filed against education entities.  See, Gibson Dunn, List of Qui Tam Educational 
Cases (2013), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/QuiTamEducationalCases.pdf 
(providing list of cases) (last visited Dec. 16, 2013). 
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explains the limited paths to redress afforded victims of recruitment 
deception.  Part V presents the negligent educational recruitment theory. 
 
I: CONFLICTING ROLES OF ADMISSIONS OFFICERS  
 
The business of higher education ensures that admissions officers live a 
dual, often conflicted, existence.  In one sense, they are counselors 
responsible for advising prospective students.  In another sense, they are 
salespeople with obligations to meet institutional and individual 
enrollment goals.  The roles are understandable.  The admissions office is 
often the first point of contact for the public, particularly prospective 
students.  Therefore, admissions officers serve as critical sources of 
information and guidance.  The admissions office is also a major, if not 
principal, revenue center.  When prospective students become actual 
students, they also become sources of revenue.14  Schools need students in 
order to survive and thrive, financially and otherwise.  And it is the 
admissions office that fosters the process of renewal that takes place at the 
beginning of each enrollment period.   
 
A review of recent admissions job announcements illustrates this duality.  
Florida Southern College, a Methodist Church affiliated institution15 that 
sits on a picturesque campus16 designed by renowned architect Frank 
Lloyd Wright,17 recently posted an announcement for an admissions 
counselor.18  The first sentence of the announcement states that the 
incumbent is “responsible for meeting or exceeding the freshman 
recruitment goal.”19  While recruitment goals can pertain to different 
objectives, including student credentials and demographics, these goals 
commonly center on sheer numbers of students enrolled.  So, immediately, 
the announcement makes clear that job responsibilities and therefore job 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 SHEILA SLAUGHTER & GARY RHOADES, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND THE NEW 
ECONOMY: MARKETS, STATES, AND HIGHER EDUCATION 2 (2004) (discussing how, upon 
enrollment, students become sources of tuition funds as well as university services and 
trademarked goods). 
15 Florida Southern College, History & Traditions, 
http://www.flsouthern.edu/about_fsc/history.htm.  
16 Florida Southern College, Florida Southern College is the “Most Beautiful Campus” 
for the Second Year in a Row, 
https://www.flsouthern.edu/news.asp?ACTION=view&ID=1038 (“For an unprecedented 
second consecutive year, Florida Southern College has been named the No. 1 Most 
Beautiful Campus in America by the prestigious Princeton Review.”). 
17 Florida Southern College, Points of Pride, 
http://www.flsouthern.edu/about_fsc/pride.htm (highlighting that Florida Southern is the 
only college campus in the world designed by Wright). 
18 HigherEdJobs, Admissions Counselor, Florida Southern College, 
http://www.higheredjobs.com/admin/details.cfm?JobCode=175732749&Title=Admission
s%20Counselor (last visited May 8, 2013) [Hereinafter FSC Admissions Counselor 
position]. 
19  Id.  
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performance is premised on getting the proverbial “asses in classes.”20  
But the announcement also highlights the incumbent’s counseling 
responsibilities, specifically, articulating “the mission and values of the 
College” and advising “prospective students and their parents through all 
phases of the admissions and financial aid processes.”21  In one role, the 
admissions officer has a personal interest in successfully inducing 
prospects to enroll.  But in her other role, she must serve the interests of 
these same prospects by communicating accurate, honest, and helpful 
information.   
 
Becker College, a private not-for-profit institution that caters to non-
traditional students (as well as a traditional-aged population) also recently 
sought an admissions counselor.  The announcement initially highlights 
the position’s counseling responsibilities, specifically, “pre-admission 
advising.”22  But the tone of the announcement shifts quickly to the sales 
responsibilities.  The incumbent would be responsible for telemarketing 
and managing corporate relationships, with the goal of increasing 
enrollment.23  Unsurprisingly, experience in lead generation, sales, or 
marketing is desired.   
 
In the for-profit higher education sector, where ever-growing enrollment is 
central to profitability, the sales role tends to take prominence over the 
counseling role.  A recent announcement seeking “goal-oriented” 
admissions recruiters at The Art of Institute of York—Pennsylvania 
highlights this prominence.24  The goal orientation is made clear when the 
announcement expresses a desire for applicants with experience selling 
timeshares, insurance, financial services, and, unsurprisingly, 
automobiles.25  While the announcement mentions that recruiters guide 
prospective students through the admissions and enrollment processes, the 
tone of the announcement strongly suggests that this guidance is another 
form of selling—akin to a used car salesman “counseling” a customer into 
the “right” car.   
 
Conflation of the sales and counseling roles is dangerous, especially in the 
higher education setting.  As highlighted earlier, while most people are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 University of Phoenix, OPEID 020988 00, PRCN 200340922254, at 10 (Dep’t of 
Education Jan. 5, 2004) (program review report) [hereinafter UOP Program Review 
Report] (identifying “asses in classes” and “butts in seats” as the premises underlying 
University of Phoenix’s recruiter compensation plans). 
21 FSC Admissions Counselor position, supra note 18. 
22 HigherEdJobs, Admissions Counselor, Becker College, 
http://www.higheredjobs.com/admin/details.cfm?JobCode=175732689&Title=Admission
s%20Counselor (last visited May 7, 2013). 
23 Id. 
24 HigherEdJobs, Admissions Recruiter, The Art Institute of York—Pennsylvania, 
http://www.higheredjobs.com/admin/details.cfm?JobCode=175731650&Title=Admission
s%20Recruiter (last visited May 7, 2013). 
25 Id. 
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suspicious of a used car salesman’s counsel, most are willing to trust the 
guidance offered by an admissions officer.  This leaves the targets of 
recruitment deception in a defenseless mindset and, therefore, ripe for a 
sucker sale.  The risks are illustrated in a lawsuit against The Art of 
Institute of York—Pennsylvania, its peer institutions, and its parent 
company, Education Management Corporation (EDMC).   
 
A. U.S. v. Education Management Corp. 
 
The suit, U.S. v. Education Management Corp.,26 was originally filed in 
2007 by two former EDMC employees who allege that EDMC and its 
subsidiaries operated unlawful compensation schemes where admissions 
officers were paid based on the number of students they induced to 
enroll.27  The suit was brought pursuant to the federal False Claims Acts,28 
which allows private individuals with personal knowledge of fraud against 
the federal government to bring suit against alleged defrauders in the name 
of the government and share in any recovery.29  The bases of the alleged 
fraud were various certifications that EDMC submitted to the Department 
of Education (ED) declaring their compliance with relevant statutory and 
regulatory provisions, including the ban on incentive compensation for 
admissions officers.30  These certifications are required in order for 
institutions to become, and remain, eligible to collect federal student aid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 No. 07-461 (W.D. Penn. Aug. 8, 2011). 
27 In 1992, Congress banned the use of incentive compensation for recruiters “based on 
its concern that schools were creating incentives for recruiters to enroll students who 
could not graduate or could not find employment after graduating.”  Association of 
Private Sector Colleges and Universities v. Duncan, No. 11-5174, at 6 (D.C. Cir. Jun. 5, 
2012), available at 
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/969CEC5FCB92F81685257A14004F
3131/$file/11-5174-1377087.pdf.  In 2002, twelve “safe harbors” or exceptions to the ban 
were enacted.  These exceptions, however, were eliminated from the regulations in 2010, 
based on a determination by ED that “‘unscrupulous’ institutions used the safe harbor for 
salary adjustments to ‘circumvent the intent’ of the HEA and to avoid detection and 
sanction for engaging in unlawful compensation practices.”  Id. at 23.  The relevant facts 
in this case occurred while the safe harbors were still in effect.   
28 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 – 3733. 
29 Through the Act, violators are liable for civil penalties between $5,500 and $11,000 for 
each false claim and triple the amount of actual damages to the government.  Relators 
(the persons who initiate the action) are entitled to receive 15% to 30% of the amount 
recovered.  See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A PRIMER, 
http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf (last visited May 
23, 2013).  
30 Joint Complaint in Intervention by Plaintiffs at 22, U.S. v. Education Management 
Corp., No. 07-461 (W.D. Penn. August 8, 2011) (“EDMC knowingly made false 
statements, certifications, and claims regarding compliance with the Incentive 
Compensation Ban in order to become and remain eligible to receive Title IV funding.”).  
See, also, id. at 52 (“Every request for a federal grant, every request for a [federal 
student] loan…every interest payment on a subsidized Stafford Loan,  and every 
government payment on a [student] loan…constitutes a separate false claim.”). 
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funds.31  In 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) intervened in the 
case (an uncommon occurrence that was likely a sign that the allegations 
appear provable32) along with several states that disbursed student aid in 
reliance on similar certifications.33  In total, the lawsuit alleges that EDMC 
fraudulently received more than $11 billion in federal funds34 and more 
than $138 million from the intervening states.35 
 
Within EDMC-owned schools, the lawsuit describes a “boiler room” sales 
culture in which recruiting and enrolling new students was the “relentless 
and exclusive focus.”36  Unlawful compensation schemes, where an 
admissions officer’s pay and advancement hinged on the numbers of 
students he induced to enroll, were the alleged outgrowth of this culture.37  
Admissions officers were required to approve students, irrespective of 
their qualifications or life circumstances.38  For example, applicants 
without personal computers were allegedly recruited for online 
programs.39 
 
Admission officers were also trained in high-pressure sales techniques.  
They were encouraged to identify and exploit an applicant’s 
vulnerabilities—a technique known as “finding the pain.”40  The “pain” 
often took the form of a deep-seated, unattained goal.  So if an applicant 
expressed a desire for a better life, admissions officers were instructed to 
use this goal as a means of inducing the applicant to enroll, even if 
enrollment would offer little prospect of achieving the goal (or alleviating 
the “pain”).  The objective was to overcome an applicant’s reluctance or 
skepticism by appealing to his emotions—and, if necessary, by offering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Initial eligibility requires an institution to enter into a Program Participation Agreement 
with ED; subsequent eligibility requires institutions to submit annual Required 
Management Assertions.  Id. at 15 (discussing Program Participation Agreement).  See, 
also, id. at 17 (discussing Required Management Assertions). 
32 DOJ has intervened in seven of the 45 most recent federal False Claims Act lawsuits 
filed against education entities.  Settlements were reached in four of the cases; the other 
three are pending.  Gibson Dunn, supra note 13. 
33 The intervening states were California, Florida, Illinois, and Indiana.  Joint Complaint 
in Intervention by Plaintiffs at 22. 
34 Id. at 24. 
35 The following are the amounts the intervening states are alleging EDMC received 
through fraudulent means: California: $93 million, Illinois: $27.5 million, Indiana: $12.3 
million, Florida: $5.2 million. 
36 Id. at 27. 
37 Id. See, also, id. at 28 (providing overview of alleged compensation arrangement). 
38 According to the lawsuit, admissions officers were instructed to enroll students even if 
they lacked basic skills, such as the ability to write, or even if they seemed to be under 
the influence of drugs. Id. at 32. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 33.   
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deception.41  The pressure applied by admissions officers onto prospects42 
reflected the top-down pressure to increase enrollments.43  The incentives 
built into their compensation structure, even if legal, rendered EDMC 
admissions officers nothing more than salespeople masquerading as 
counselors—proverbial wolves in sheep’s clothing.   
 
PART II: THE HIGHER EDUCATION MARKET 
 
The aftermath of WWII saw the creation of a favorable market for higher 
education in the U.S.  The GI Bill,44 passed in 1944, prompted an 
unprecedented influx of students into the nation’s colleges and 
universities.45  Lawmakers were concerned about the prospect of millions 
of returning veterans flooding the job market.46  So incentives were 
created for veterans to undertake higher education instead of potentially 
damaging the fragile post-Depression recovery.  When the original bill 
ended in 1956, almost 8 million veterans had taken advantage of its higher 
education benefits, and at its peak in 1947, veterans accounted for half of 
the admissions applications submitted to colleges and universities.47   
 
The GI Bill, while a boon for institutions,48 set the stage for the 
competitive market pressures that we see today.  Unlike other federal 
investments in higher education, which provided aid directly to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Id. at 32.  See, also, HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 16 (“Recruiters are encouraged to 
search for and exploit potential students’ emotional vulnerabilities by finding a ‘pain 
point’.”). 
42 Id. at 34 (alleging that admissions officers were expected to engage in various high 
pressure tactics in order to ensure that applicants completed their enrollment). 
43 Id. at 42 (quoting emails sent to admissions officers from their supervisors stressing the 
importance of hitting enrollment targets). 
44 Through the GI Bill, veterans who served more than 90 days were granted education 
benefits, including tuition grants and stipends.  The tuition grants were generous enough 
to cover expenses some of the most expensive schools.  The stipends are estimated to 
have covered 50-70% of the opportunity costs of not working.  See, e.g., JOHN BOUND & 
SARAH TURNER, GOING TO WAR AND GOING TO COLLEGE: DID WORLD WAR II AND THE 
G.I. BILL INCREASE EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT FOR RETURNING VETERANS? 7 (1999), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7452.pdf?new_window=1.  But, see, IRA KATZNELSON, 
WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE 114 (2005) (discussing the discriminatory 
nature in which GI Bill benefits were distributed).   
45 U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, The GI Bill’s History: Born of Controversy: GI Bill of 
Rights, http://www.gibill.va.gov/benefits/history_timeline/  (characterizing higher 
education as an “unreachable dream for the average American” prior to the GI Bill) 
[Hereinafter The GI Bill’s History].   
46 ROBERT ZEMSKY, GREGORY R. WEGNER & WILLIAM F. MASSY, REMAKING THE 
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: MARKET-SMART AND MISSION-CENTERED 190 (2006) (“The 
original impetus for giving tuition benefits was to keep them out of the labor market at 
least for a while.”). 
47 The GI Bill’s History, supra note 45. 
48 ZEMSKY, ET AL., supra note 46, at 190 (asserting that the influx of veterans helped 
“restart” many colleges and universities whose programs had stagnated during the war).  
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institutions, GI Bill aid was provided directly to the student.49  This novel 
approach allowed beneficiaries to ostensibly vote with their feet, and take 
their aid with them.  The GI Bill’s approach to student aid served as a 
blueprint for the wholesale transition to “mobile” aid that took place in 
1972.  That year, Congress amended the Higher Education Act (HEA) to 
award federal grants and loans directly to students, preparing the seedbed 
from which the student-consumer mindset would sprout.50   
 
A. Search of Tangibility 
 
The rising cost of higher education,51 along with an increasing belief that 
higher education was a private “economic necessity,”52 solidified the 
student-consumer mindset.  This transition presented a new challenge for 
institutions—how to frame themselves to a population increasingly 
perceiving education as a consumable product.  Colleges and universities 
are part of the “trust economy” because buyers have to trust that they will 
get the “product” for which they are paying.53  Building this trust requires 
tangibility; but education itself is intangible.54  Schools, however, have 
traditionally sought to create tangibility by highlighting factors such as 
academic quality, buildings and amenities, and athletics.55   
 
Academics are often touted using favorable showings on ranking lists 
compiled by outside entities, such as U.S. News and World Report.56  In 
spite of their dubious value,57 these lists are popular with students and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 See, e.g., Martin Trow, Federalism in American Higher Education, in HIGHER 
LEARNING IN AMERICA 58 (Arthur Levine ed., 1993).  
50 SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 35. 
51 See, e.g., id. at 283 (explaining the state-level shift from providing subsidies to 
institutions to requiring students to foot a larger portion of their costs of attendance).  See, 
also, e.g. ZEMSKY, ET AL., supra note 46, at 166 (describing the increasing prominence of 
students loans and the “truly awesome levels of personal indebtedness” students were 
incurring in order to fund their higher education).  
52 ZEMSKY, ET AL., supra note 46, at 11 (“During the last fifty years a college education 
has come to be perceived as an economic necessity pursued by the many, rather than a 
privilege reserved for the few.”).   See, also, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE CONG. OF 
THE U.S., A CBO PAPER: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO FINANCING COLLEGE 
EDUCATION 4 (2004) [hereinafter CBO PAPER], 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4984/01-23-Education.pdf (concluding that the 
financial payoff of higher education has engendered an investment mindset among 
students). 
53 ERIC J. ANCTIL, SELLING HIGHER EDUCATION: MARKETING AND ADVERTISING 
AMERICA’S COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 9 (2009) (citing another author’s theory on the 
trust economies). 
54 Id. at 6 (“Much of what is ‘for sale’ in higher education are the intangibles such as 
learning and lived experiences.”). 
55 Id. at 53. 
56 SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 23. 
57 See, e.g., Bill Destler, The Ultimate Absurdity of College Rankings HUFFPOST (May 5, 
2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-destler/the-ultimate-absurdity-
of_b_3247841.html?utm_hp_ref=tw. 
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parents because they ostensibly add a degree of simplicity to the 
complicated process of measuring and comparing academic quality.  Put 
differently, they “[fuse] education with consumption” by suggesting that 
one educational product is superior (or inferior) to another,58 akin to a 
Consumer Reports review of washing machines.  
 
The buildings dotting a school’s campus and the amenities offered can 
make or break a student’s enrollment decision.59  In fact, for some 
students, amenities are more important than perceived academic quality.60  
This reality has fueled physical expansion and a marketing emphasis on 
things such as plush dormitories,61 lavish student centers,62 and restaurant 
quality meal options.63  Similar to the lists purporting to measure academic 
quality, lists assessing things like “The 25 Most Amazing Campus Student 
Recreation Centers” have a pervasive presence online.64   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 23. 
59 Brian Jacob, Brian McCall & Kevin M. Stange, College as Country Club: Do Colleges 
Cater to Students’ Preferences for Consumption?, 29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 18745, 2013), available at 
http://www.freakonomics.com/media/CollegeConsumptionJan2013.pdf. (“We have 
documented a substantial enrollment response to spending on student services  and 
auxiliary enterprises, which we interpret as reflective of the importance of consumption 
considerations in students’ decisions.”) 
60 Id. at 31 (“Less selective schools (particularly privates)…have a greater incentive to 
focus on consumption amenities, since this is what their marginal students value.”). 
61 For example, Princeton describes its palatial and much ballyhooed Whitman College 
dormitory thus:   
Walls of hand-set stone rise from 20 feet to as high as 100 feet to make 
up the complex of residential, social and academic buildings that sweep 
upward above terraced courtyards. Bluestone walkways criss-cross at 
the feet of dorms and communal buildings, which include a large 
gabled dining hall and a great tower that announces the entry into the 
college near the south end of Princeton's campus.  
Cass Cliatt, Princeton’s Whitman College Marks Revival of Traditional 
Architecture (Sep. 24, 2007), 
http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S19/04/10O93/?section=featured. 
62 The University of Missouri boasts that students “won't find a better facility in the world 
than what we've got right here at Mizzou.”  With a rock wall, a grotto, and a “beach club” 
(which has been described as an indoor beach), the boasting is probably warranted.  
University of Missouri, MizzouRec: Facilities, http://www.mizzourec.com/facilities/ (last 
visited May 8, 2013). 
63 High Point University runs a steakhouse, 1924 PRIME, where students can purchase 
meals through the university’s meal plan.  High Point University, 1924 Prime, 
http://1924prime.highpoint.edu/ (last visited May 8, 2013).  
64 See, e.g., Best College Reviews, The 25 Most Amazing Campus Student Recreation 
Centers, http://www.bestcollegereviews.org/features/the-25-most-amazing-campus-
student-recreation-centers/ (“In an era when students are more…discerning than ever, 
university officials have gone on a major building boom that has seen designer dorms, 
stunning libraries, and amazing recreation centers.”) . 
[DATE] HIGHER EDUCATION SUCKER SALE 13 
Athletics can provide another measure of perceived tangibility to a higher 
education product.65  A winning sports team can have a halo effect upon 
every aspect of the institution (e.g., “If the football team is this good, the 
engineering program must be good too.”).66  Therefore, many schools 
spend inordinate amounts of money, running significant deficits,67 
attempting to build winning athletic programs that will rally their fans and 
thrust their school onto national television and atop the major polls (i.e., 
athletic rankings).68 
 
The 1990s brought another form of tangibility: outcomes.  Higher 
education was caught up in what has been described as “the third wave of 
accountability.”69  The first two waves took place the decade before and 
focused on corporate America70 and “big government”71 respectively.  The 
third wave, which brought scrutiny upon higher education, was largely the 
result of fiscal pressures which prompted many to question the value of 
higher education.72  Specifically, did the tangible outcomes produced by 
the nation’s colleges and universities justify the costs, particularly the 
public cost, of supporting these institutions?  For institutions, this question 
was not readily answerable.  Access had previously been the touchstone 
by which higher education was judged.73  That focus was an outgrowth of 
the civil rights and War on Poverty eras when higher education was seen 
as a cure to the nation’s racial and economic ills.  Focusing on outcomes, 
the end-results, presented a novel perspective from which to judge 
educational effectiveness, especially when the vast diversity of 
institutions, their missions, and their students were considered.74 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 ANCTIL, supra note 53, at 61. 
66 Id. at 60. 
67 DONNA M. DESROCHERS, ACADEMIC SPENDING VERSUS ATHLETIC SPENDING: WHO 
WINS? 10 (2013), 
http://www.deltacostproject.org/pdfs/DeltaCostAIR_AthleticAcademic_Spending_IssueB
rief.pdf (“Fewer than one in four of the 97 public [Football Bowl Subdivision] athletic 
departments generated more money than they spent in any given year between 2005 and 
2010.”). 
68 Id. at 63 (explaining that a “visible” athletic program gives supporters something 
tangible to rally around, adds to the relevance and value of the school’s brand, and 
provides free advertising). 
69 RICHARD S. RUCH, HIGHER ED, INC.: THE RISE OF THE FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITY 6 
(2001). 
70 Id. (explaining that “massive layoffs and restructuring” were the impetuses behind this 
wave). 
71 Id. (citing “government spending and the national deficit” as impetuses). 
72 ZEMSKY, ET AL., supra note 46, at 190 (“When the economy stalls or inflation takes off 
or the unemployment rises, colleges and universities are viewed with the same crankiness 
as other major entities.”). 
73 SANDRA R. BAUM, INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY, FINANCIAL AID TO LOW-
INCOME COLLEGE STUDENTS: ITS HISTORY AND PROSPECTS 5 (1987), 
http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED377265.pdf (discussing the influence that the “rising 
concern for the disadvantaged in the quest for higher education” had on financial aid 
policy).  
74 ZEMSKY, ET AL., supra note 46, at 145. 
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B. Emergence of For-Profit Colleges 
 
Accompanying the “third wave” was another trend that would affect 
higher education—the emergence of for-profit education providers.  These 
institutions have a long history dating back to Colonial times;75 but it was 
during the 1990s that the industry experienced immense growth and 
corporatization.  The sector evolved from being primarily composed of 
mom-and-pop operations awarding vocational certificates to being 
dominated by large publicly traded or private equity owned corporations 
awarding academic degrees as well.76  The sector’s emergence was made 
possible in 1972 when Congress allowed students attending for-profit 
schools to receive the newly mobile federal aid.77  The block grants 
previously awarded to schools for student aid flowed only to not-for-profit 
institutions.78  Congress saw expanding aid to students attending for-profit 
schools as a means of increasing higher education access,79 and also as a 
means of encouraging competition among institutions.80  There was a hope 
that this increased competition would drive down costs of attendance—a 
laughable proposition in hindsight.  For-profit institutions rightfully 
viewed this expansion as a “bonanza.”81  Additionally, the 1998 revisions 
of the Higher Education Act brought further legal and financial legitimacy 
to for-profit schools.  They were added to the “Definition of Institution of 
Higher Education for Purposes of Title IV Programs,” which formally put 
them on equal footing with not-for-profit schools.82 
 
For-profit schools benefitted from the larger rhetorical context, in that they 
spoke the language of commoditization: education was a product; students 
were consumers; learning could be tangible.  They fully embraced “The 
Three Cs”—competition, commodification, and commercialism83—
notions that many viewed as an affront, if not a threat, to traditional, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 RUCH, supra note 69, at 52. 
76 See, HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 31 (chronicling the corporatization of for-profit 
higher education).  The 10 largest for-profit education corporations, all publicly traded, 
enroll approximately 1,406,875 students, with Apollo Group, parent company of 
University of Phoenix, accounting for 470,800 of that number.  Id.at 20. 
77 SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 35. 
78 Id. 
79 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-97-104, PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS: 
MILLIONS SPENT TO TRAIN STUDENTS FOR OVERSUPPLIED OCCUPATIONS 7 (1997), 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he97104.pdf.  
80 SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 35 (“Federal legislation supported 
marketlike competition for students among higher education institutions on the grounds 
that greater efficiency would lead to cost reductions.”). 
81 RUCH, supra note 69, at 164.  See, also, id. (chronicling the corruption among for-
profit schools that took place in the aftermath of the 1972 revisions). 
82 20 U.S.C. 1001 (1965), amended by 20 U.S.C. 1001 6 (1998), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/leg/hea98/HR6.pdf (listing entities that were added 
to the definition via amendments to the Act). 
83 ZEMSKY, ET AL., supra note 46, at 86. 
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mission-driven higher education.84  So while Congress had essentially 
deemed all schools identical, irrespective of whether they were driven by 
mission or profit, those divergent aims fostered fundamental differences in 
how schools viewed themselves and presented themselves to the public.  
The tangibility of outcomes was readily embraced by for-profit schools, 
and they brought a classic business approach to marketing and 
recruitment.  The larger climate, typified by The Three Cs, would 
eventually force many not-for-profits to take the same tack.   
 
Today, most schools engage in some form of strategic self-promotion.  
The overarching purpose of these efforts is to shape public perceptions of 
the institutions and their programs.  Favorable perceptions can attract 
strong students and faculty, as well as garner broader financial and 
political support.  The best promotional efforts seek to build and nurture 
brands aligned with institutional mission and goals.85  A brand is 
intangible—an image or perception.86  A brand is not specifically about 
products, but a favorable brand can confer added value, or “brand equity,” 
upon products.87  In fact, strong brand equity can create demand for a 
weak product.88  In some ways, this phenomenon is similar to the halo 
effect discussed earlier.  But the broad relevance of brands does not render 
products unimportant.  Companies must still create awareness of their 
products.89  Indeed it is often awareness that differentiates similar 
products, not necessarily product quality or distinctiveness.90  In order to 
encourage product awareness, a company must identify potential 
consumers and communicate with them via an effective marketing 
strategy.91   
 
C. The Student-Consumer 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 It is commonly asserted and largely accepted that the commoditization of education is a 
relatively new phenomenon; but some argue that education has always been driven by 
commercial interests, having started as a commercial endeavor and evolved into a 
mission-driven one.  ZEMSKY, ET AL., supra note 46, at 52.  See, also, SLAUGHTER & 
RHOADES, supra note 14, at 12 (“Colleges and universities [are] actors initiating 
academic capitalism, not just…players being ‘corporatized.’”). 
85 Id. at 27. 
86 Id. at 35 (“Branding is about asking, When a person hears our name, what does he or 
she thing about?”). 
87 Id.  
88 SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 260 (“Although corporations manufacture 
products, what consumers actually buy are brands.”). 
89 ANCTIL, supra note 53, at 51. 
90 Id.  
91 See, e.g., id. at 14 (describing the Elaboration Likelihood Model, which is a theory of 
the process by which marketing communication prompts a customer to purchase a 
product or service). 
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The most prominent consumers of higher education are students.92  But 
students are more than passive purchasers of a product; they actually 
contribute to the product’s quality.  For example, strong students improve 
the overall educational experience.93  This introduces another distinctive 
element into the higher education consumer-provider relationship: 
selectivity.  Given the manner in which students influence the educational 
experience, most schools do not accept every applicant (or prospective 
consumer) who is willing to pay the tuition (or cost of the educational 
product).94  Selective schools often choose among large pools of 
prospective consumers in determining which it finds meritorious enough 
to acquire access to the product, akin to a doorman outside of a trendy 
South Beach nightclub.  Even non-selective schools tend to turn down 
some willing buyers.  
 
This selectivity is typically the result of high student demand relative to 
the supply of seats.95  Selectivity can serve as a proxy, albeit a flawed one, 
for quality.  Knowing this, schools often engage in efforts to manipulate 
selectivity indicators.96  They strategically deflate their admit rates by 
encouraging applications from prospective students with little chance of 
gaining admission.97  Some schools also deny the admission of strong 
applicants based on a belief that these applicants only consider the schools 
a fallback or “safety” choice.98  In the worst cases, schools misrepresent 
student credentials, in order to make their entering classes appear 
stronger.99  But there is another, possibly more legitimate, motivation for 
selectivity, and that is when students leave the institution, they become 
representations of their educational experiences and of the institution 
itself.100  Put differently, they become products of the product.  So their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Higher education institutions cater to other consumers as well, including donors and 
sponsors of research.  But students are the dominant consumers of higher education.  See, 
e.g., Caroline Hoxby, College as Country Club: Do Colleges Cater to Students’ 
Preferences for Consumption? 20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
6323, 1997). 
93 See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON & MORTON OWEN SCHAPIRO, THE STUDENT AID 
GAME: MEETING NEED AND REWARDING TALENT IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 113 
(1998) (“Mixing weak and strong students raises the overall performance of the student 
population as the gains of the weak students exceed the losses of the strong students.”).   
94 ANCTIL, supra note 53, at 13 (“Rather than selling to any willing and able buyer, 
colleges and universities have a vested interest to ensure that who buys from them is a 
person they want  integrated into their largest input pool.”). 
95 Eric Hoover, Application Inflation: Bigger Numbers Mean Better Students, Colleges 
Say. But When is Enough Enough?, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Nov. 5, 
2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Application-Inflation/125277/.  
96 SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 290. 
97 Hoover, supra note 95 (“Some deans and guidance counselors...question the ethics of 
intense recruitment by colleges that reject the overwhelming majority of applicants.”). 
98 SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 290. 
99 See, e.g., Supiano, supra note 11. 
100 See, e.g., SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 14, at 44. 
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successes or failures can be compelling reflections of the educational 
products they purchased.   
 
Federal policy has helped encourage a highly stratified system of higher 
education in the U.S.  The Morrill Acts, initially passed in 1862 and 
extended in 1890,101 greatly expanded public higher education, allowing 
these institutions to join a landscape already populated by private, mostly 
religious-affiliated institutions.102  These newly created public institutions 
tended to focus on the development of skills in a way the older schools 
had not.103  In addition, federal financial aid policy combined with other 
factors, such as deregulated (and cheaper) travel and communication costs, 
fostered increased student mobility.104  The result was a higher education 
market where within-college homogeneity rose and between-college 
homogeneity fell.105  In other words, the individuals making up a 
particular student body became more similar while the student bodies 
became more different than others.  This stratification led to the formation 
of niches.  Much of this process was the outcome of institutional 
competition.106  But the most strategic institutions developed marketing 
strategies tailored to existing or aspirational niches.  And while these 
efforts were not limited to the for-profit sector, the sector embraced such 
efforts as fundamental to its success.107 
 
PART III: FOR-PROFIT COLLEGE MARKETING AND 
RECRUITMENT 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 The federal government granted states 30,000 acres of land per member of Congress.  
States were free to dispose of the land as they wished, but were required to use the 
proceeds to establish agricultural and mechanic arts education.  See, e.g., Trow, supra 
note 49. 
102 See, e.g., Lawrence E. Gladieux & Jacqueline E. King, The Federal Government and 
Higher Education, in AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: 
SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES 152 (Philip G. Altbach, Robert O. 
Berdahl, & Patricia Gumport eds., 1999). 
103 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. LUCAS, AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 154 (2006) 
(explaining how the goal of the Morrill Act was “to promote the liberal and practical 
education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions of life”). 
104 Hoxby, supra note 92, at 8 (providing a detail review of student mobility trends and 
their causes).  
105 Id. at 2 (In the geographically integrated market, students…are sorted more 
thoroughly among colleges based on their demand for education and ability to contribute 
to education production.”) 
106 Id. at 15 (“If students have heterogeneous demands for college quality, the result is a 
market in which colleges produce education service at a number of different quality 
levels.”) 
107 ANCTIL, supra note 53, at 23 (“Commercial higher education’s profitability depends 
largely on the staggering amount each institution spends on marketing and advertising.”).  
See, also, ZEMSKY, ET AL., supra note 46, at 187 (“Being purely market-driven, for-profit 
education targeted only those parts of the post-secondary education market that offered 
the promise of greatest financial return.”). 
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For-profit schools spend large amounts of money building brands and 
generating awareness about their educational products.  In 2009, the 15 
publicly-traded for-profit education corporations spent an average of $248 
million each on marketing and recruitment,108 which accounted for almost 
a quarter of their collective total revenue.109  A couple of them spent 
almost a third of total revenue.110  This trend held industry-wide, with the 
30 for-profit education corporations (publicly-traded and privately-held) 
dedicating 23% of revenue, or $4 billion, to marketing and recruitment.111  
By comparison, it has been estimated that not-for-profit schools spend less 
than 5% of total revenue on these activities.112  On average, for-profit 
schools spent more per student on marketing and recruitment than they did 
on instruction—$2,622 versus $2,050.113  Apollo Group, the parent 
corporation of University of Phoenix, spent two-and-a-half times more on 
seeking students than it did on instructing them.114   
    
For-profit schools spend so much on marketing and recruitment because 
their very existence depends on a steady, robust stream of new students.  
A U.S. Senate report provides a compelling illustration:  
 
Corinthian Colleges, Inc.115 began 2010 with 86,066 students and 
ended with 110,550, a growth of 24,484 students.  But, in the same 
period, 113,317 students left the company (some by graduating or 
completing programs), requiring Corinthian to enroll 137,831 new 
students to achieve that growth.  In other words, to achieve net 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 This figure includes all expenses relating to marketing and recruitment, including 
salaries for recruitment staff.  HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 81. 
109 Id. 
110 Grand Canyon University spent 32.6% of its total revenue on marketing and 
recruitment; Bridgepoint Education spent 32.1%.  Id. 
111 Id. 
112 ANCTIL, supra note 53, at 23 (citing a study, but warning that the estimate was made 
without the benefit of firm numbers).  While precise data on marketing and recruitment 
spending among not-for-profit schools is hard to come by, it very safe to assume that it 
pales in comparison to the for-profit sector, especially when compared to instructional 
spending.  Advertising and marketing expenditures are often classified as “Institutional 
Support” expenses, along with other broad expenditures, including administrative staff 
salaries.  Given this breadth, it can be assumed that advertising and marketing comprise 
only a small portion of the overall Institutional Support expense category.  A 2009 study 
of higher education spending found that instructional expenditures were higher than 
Institutional Support expenditures across all types of not-for-profit colleges and 
universities.  DELTA COST PROJECT, TRENDS IN COLLEGE SPENDING: WHERE DOES THE 
MONEY COME FROM? WHERE DOES IT GO? 41 (2009) 
http://deltacostproject.org/resources/pdf/trends_in_spending-report.pdf. 
113 Compare HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 81 (providing per student marketing 
expenditures), with HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 87 (providing per student 
instructional expenses). 
114 Id. at 87. 
115 Corinthian Colleges, Inc. is a publicly-traded corporation with the fifth largest 
enrollment—113,800 students in fall 2010. See, e.g., id. at 20. 
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enrollment growth, Corinthian has to enroll the equivalent of its 
entire student body each year.116  
 
Counteracting this churn requires a widely-disseminated message tailored 
effectively to the audience for whom it is intended.  The for-profit college 
audience, or niche, tends to be comprised of practical-minded individuals, 
who are largely unconcerned with prestige or the ancillary trappings of 
“college life.”117  They tend to be older than so-called traditional 
students,118 with familial obligations;119 therefore, convenience is 
important.120  Fundamentally, what they are seeking is “a no-nonsense 
academic experience tied to a practical outcome.”121  Knowing its niche, 
for-profit institutions root their marketing pitch, and indeed their brand, in 
outcomes-based tangibility.  Unsurprisingly, they promote things such as 
career preparation, comprehensive student services, and financial payoff.  
And they find the pain.   
 
A. Deceptive Marketing 
 
ITT Technical Institutes122 markets its educational products with 
compelling first-person ads featuring satisfied alumni.  Below is a 
testimonial offered in a recent ITT ad: 
 
I was working 60, 70, 80 hours a week before I went to ITT Tech.  I 
was at work one day alone, and some people came into the 
restaurant through a back entrance and robbed me at gunpoint.  
That was the final straw—and that was when I found ITT Tech.  It 
offers the ability to keep my job, to spend time with my family…and 
I discovered that I could work and go to school and progress all at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Id. at 77. 
117 See, e.g., ANCTIL, supra note 53, at 22. 
118 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-600, PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS: 
STRONGER DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO HELP ENSURE ONLY 
ELIGIBLE STUDENTS RECEIVE FEDERAL STUDENT AID 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09600.pdf.  
119 Enforcement of Federal Anti-Fraud Laws in For-Profit Education: Hearings Before 
the H. Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 109th Cong. 109-2 (2005) (statement of 
Nick Glakas) (stating that proprietary schools enroll a large percentage of single 
mothers). 
120 See, e.g., id. (“Students choose to attend for-profit colleges because these delivery 
methods meet their time and geographical needs, allowing them to achieve their 
postsecondary education goals while continuing to meet the demands of their everyday 
lives.”).   
121 RUCH, supra note 69, at 134. 
122 ITT Educational Services, Inc. the parent company of ITT Technical Institutes, is a 
publicly-traded corporation with the seventh largest enrollment—88,000 as of fall 2010.  
See, e.g., HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 21. 
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the same time and get to where I wanted to be—which is where I’m 
at now.123 
 
The testimonial touches on major themes that a typical for-profit student 
would find important: the obtainment of job preparation that allows for the 
maintenance of employment and familial commitments, with the end-
result being personal and professional advancement—and much alleviated 
pain.  
 
Corinthian markets its Everest brand of colleges with a focus on academic 
and student support.  One commercial in particular is probably familiar to 
anyone who watches daytime or late-night television.  It features an actor 
uttering a monologue, as if speaking to a person from whose point of view 
the commercial is being filmed.  The actor speaks in an edgy tone that 
evinces the emotion of a “tough love” speech.  The commercial became an 
internet meme, spawning hundreds, if not thousands, of parodies.124  But 
humor aside, the commercial is another example of how for-profit schools 
often market their programs: 
  
“You’re sitting on the couch, you’re watching TV, and your life is 
passing you by.  [You] keep procrastinating over and over, ‘Well 
maybe I’ll go to school next year, maybe next semester,’ No, do it 
right now!  They’ll work with you after work or you can go before 
work.  You can do whatever you need to do to graduate.  Go talk to 
somebody right now; [they’re] out to help you.  You spend all day 
on the phone any how!  Why don’t you make a phone call that is 
going to help you in your future?!  All you gotta do is pick up the 
phone and make the call.  Why are you making it complicated?  
It’s easy!”125 
 
The tone of the commercial is pain and shame.  The actor’s ridiculing tone 
is meant to intensify discontent a viewer might be feeling about being 
unemployed or underemployed.  In fact, the very viewing of the 
commercial is basically used as a shaming tactic.  But the goal of the 
commercial is clear: Corinthian wants to induce the viewer to “pick up the 
phone” and reach out to one of Everest’s “helpful” admissions officers, 
who of course are actually salespeople.  
 
Both commercials are effective; they frame the educational product in 
terms that their target audience would find attractive, if not compelling.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Youtube.com, ITTTech: Russell Allred, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0OFAKH3nJNY (last visited May 8, 2013). 
124 “Everest college parody” is actually an automatically populated search term on 
Youtube.  See, e.g., Youtube.com, Everest Commercial Parody, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZbclWQY8S78 (last visited May 8, 2013). 
125 Youtube.com, Original, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bbFmZIdlBw (last visited 
May 8, 2013). 
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They are proof that even products that many consider inferior can be 
marketed successfully.126  Unfortunately, both ads are also misleading.  
The alumnus in the ITT ad speaks authentically about the benefits he 
gained from the degree he earned.  The commercial, however, fails to 
make clear that the experience of the featured alumnus is, by far, an 
atypical one.  The graduation rate at the Greenville, SC campus the 
alumnus attended is only 33%.127  In other words, the vast majority of 
students who undertake studies at that ITT campus (or most any other128) 
leave before obtaining the credential they sought.  Thus, it seems safe to 
assume that, if asked, the “typical” ITT alumnus would not offer such a 
glowing endorsement of his former institution.   
 
Companies have a First Amendment right to market their products.129  
And they are allowed to use consumer testimonials to promote atypical 
product outcomes, as long as a disclaimer is provided.130  The purpose of 
the disclaimer is to prevent deception; therefore, it must inform the reader 
or viewer of a testimonial’s atypical nature.  For obvious reasons, the 
disclaimer must be conspicuous and easy to understand.  For example, the 
Federal Trade Commission once ordered La Salle University to cure 
deception in the manner in which it advertised its unaccredited law degree 
program with disclaimers “in type the same size and appearance as the 
advertising claims.”131  The ITT ad, as shown on television here in 
Missouri, lacks such disclaimers,132 increasing the chance that the 
authentic testimonial would have the effect of a misleading pitch.   
 
The Everest commercial is particularly egregious in its methods.  It fully 
embraces the “university as car dealer” posture that represents an extreme 
conception of how some institutions comport themselves within the higher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 ANCTIL, supra note 53, at 23 (“[Marketing and advertising] may not lead to a better 
product or a better experience for the consumer, but it does lead to better awareness and 
usually great purchasing volume.”). 
127 Nat’l Center for Educ. Statistics, College Navigator, ITT Technical Institute-
Greenville, http://nces.ed.gov/collegenavigator/?q=itt+tech&s=SC&id=413866 (listing 
various statistics for the campus).  
128 Fifty-two percent (52%) of ITT students who enrolled during the 2008-09 school year 
withdrew by 2010.  HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 532. 
129 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 761 (1976) (“[S]peech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money 
is spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another.”) 
130 FTC Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 
C.F.R. § 255.2 (2009). 
131 The Commission found that La Salle had misrepresented the program’s 
accreditation—a common complaint against for-profit schools as well.  In re La Salle 
Extension University 1971 FTC LEXIS 157 (1971) at 20. 
132 The 71-second online version of the commercial displays a written disclaimer 
directing the viewer to ITT’s website for information about graduation rates, program 
costs, placement rates, and debt loads.  The disclaimer provides no warnings to the 
viewer, such as those pertaining to low completion rates.  Additionally, the disclaimer is 
not displayed on the 60-second version of the commercial that runs on television.  
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education market.133  In addition to the inherent deception that comes with 
suggesting that education and career success are “easy,” the commercial 
exudes a pushiness that would be akin to an accosting if done in person.  
And like the ITT ad, the Everest commercial displays no disclaimer 
warning the viewer of the school’s low completion rates134 or any of the 
other negative outcomes.135 
 
B. Deceptive Recruitment 
 
The methods employed in these commercials, particularly the methods 
used by Everest, align closely with the methods used by for-profit college 
admissions officers.  This coordination is intentional, as the individual 
components of any effective marketing plan are integrated in furtherance 
of the same goal.136  The Senate investigation of the industry confirmed 
many of the allegations made in the suit against EDMC.  Boiler-room 
environments engender the use of aggressive and deceptive sales tactics.137  
New student enrollment goals flow down the administrative chain “from 
[the] CEO to newly-hired junior recruiters.”138  And even when unlawful 
incentive compensation plans are not in place, job security throughout the 
company hinges on the attaining enrollment growth goals.139 
 
At many for-profit schools, everything about an admissions officer’s job 
rests within sales culture.  They are not only expected to hit enrollment 
goals, but as precursors, they are also expected to make a certain number 
of recruitment phone calls, schedule a certain number of prospect 
appointments, and generate a certain number of admissions 
applications.140  Each admission officer’s progress is meticulously tracked, 
with perks and punishments awarded accordingly.141  Unsurprisingly, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 ZEMSKY, ET AL., supra note 46, at 61 (“From the car dealer perspective, universities 
wheel and deal in the marketplace.”). 
134 Corinthian Colleges, Inc., Everest’s parent company, has an overall student 
withdrawal rate of 66% from its Associate’s degree programs and 59% among its much 
smaller Bachelor’s degree enrollment. Both of these rates are above average for the 
industry as a whole.  HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 74.  
135 For example, more than 36% of students at Corinthian-owned schools who entered 
student loan repayment in 2005 defaulted within three years—a rate more than three 
times higher than the average for all institutions. Id. at 391. 
136 ANCTIL, supra note 53, at 27 (discussing the importance of aligning an institution’s 
marketing plan with its strategic plan).  
137 HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 47 (“At many [for-profit] schools…misleading 
students to secure enrollment contracts appeared to be a common practice rather than an 
exception.”). 
138 Id. at 50. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 51. 
141 Id. (explaining the discipline process used by ITT for admissions officers who failed 
to meet recruitment-related goals).  See, also, Joint Complaint in Intervention by 
Plaintiffs at 29 (describing the EDMC Guide to the Admissions Performance Plan). 
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employment turnover is high among admissions officers.142  Also 
unsurprising is the use of deceptive and aggressive sales tactics.  The 
foundation of the success of these tactics, and indeed the entire sales 
strategy, is trust.  Admissions officers—often salespeople posing as 
counselors—are directed to build trust with prospective students from the 
very first call.143  This is when the admissions officer frames herself as a 
counselor, while actually seeking to do whatever it takes to get the 
prospective student to sign an enrollment contract.144   
 
Deceptive tactics often take the form of misrepresentations about program 
costs, program length, graduation rates, the transferability of credits, and 
job placement and salary data.  Sometimes admissions officers flat-out lie 
(e.g. understating program costs).145  Other times, they use savvier 
methods.  For example, the Senate investigation found that admissions 
officers were instructed to quote program costs per term, rather than per 
year.  Such a tactic was expected to result in prospects understating 
program costs, based on an assumption that the school offered the standard 
number of 2-3 enrollment terms per year, rather than the five it actually 
offered.146  Some admissions officers were instructed to deflect questions 
about costs, even flatly refusing to answer them, if necessary.147 
 
Minimum, or “best-case,” program lengths are expressed in “worst case” 
terms.148  Low graduation rates are inflated or described using vague 
terms, such as “good.”149  Prospects are not told that credits earned from 
for-profit schools are unlikely to be accepted by other institutions.150  And 
job placement and salary data are inflated151 or otherwise characterized 
using puffery and intentional vagueness. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 52. See, also, Joint Complaint in Intervention by 
Plaintiffs at 38 (alleging a desire by an EDMC executive to increase the proportion of 
admissions officers who were fired for failure to meet enrollment targets from 17% to 
25%). 
143 HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 48. 
144 Id. at 54. 
145 Id.  (providing an example where an admissions counselor told a prospect that a 
program cost $9,500 per year, when the actual cost was $12,000). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 For example, four-year programs were described as if the timeframe was a functional 
maximum instead of the functional minimum.  Id. 
149 Id. at 55 (recounting an incident when an admissions counselor described his school’s 
25% graduation rate as “good”). 
150 Id. at 56 (“Too often, students do not learn that their credits will not transfer until after 
they leave school.”). 
151 An admissions counselor described the elements of her deceptive pitch thus: “We are 
telling you that you are going to have a 95 percent chance [of getting] a job paying 
$35,000 to $40,000 a year by the time you are done in 18 months.’’ Enforcement of 
Federal Anti-Fraud Laws in For-Profit Education: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On 
Education and the Workforce, 109th Cong. 8 (2005) [hereinafter Anti-Fraud Hearing]. 
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These admissions officers are trained in advanced techniques of closing 
the deal.  They are trained to take information disclosed to them by 
prospects, likely under a delusion of trust, and use it to induce the prospect 
to enroll.  This is how the pain is found and, when necessary, poked.152  
When prospects show reluctance, officers employ tactics such as 
hypothetical imagery (e.g. “Imagine your life with a degree.”) and false 
urgency (e.g. “We only have a few seats left in the class.”).153  And of 
course, throughout the process, admissions officers are expected to remain 
in close contact with prospective students—selling, cajoling, and 
pressuring.  A federal investigator posing as a prospective student received 
180 phone calls within a month of expressing interest in a for-profit 
academic program.154 
 
In creating product awareness, for-profit schools targets individuals they 
believe will be most receptive to their message.  There is nothing 
inherently wrong with this tactic; in fact, consumer targeting is essential to 
any effective marketing plan.  For-profit schools, however, often target 
individuals based on their susceptibility to being victimized by slick, if not 
shady, marketing and recruitment tactics.  A Vatterott College155 training 
manual listed the following targeted demographics: 
 
Welfare Mom w/Kids. Pregnant Ladies. Recent Divorce. Low Self-
Esteem. Low Income Jobs. Experienced a Recent Death. 
Physically/Mentally Abused. Recent Incarceration. Drug 
Rehabilitation. Dead-End Jobs-No Future.156    
 
A compelling argument could be made that members of disadvantaged and 
vulnerable populations should be targeted for higher education 
opportunity.  That is the underlying premise of our long-held access goals.  
However, exploitation masquerading as opportunity does more harm than 
good, resulting in educational failure and increased pain, often in the form 
of increased student loan debt. 
 
C. Educational Failure 
 
Recruitment deception contributes to bad educational matches, and bad 
educational matches lead to educational failure.157  The most salient form 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 60 (showing how “poking the pain” has been 
explained in for-profit school sales training manuals). 
153 Id. at 63. 
154 Id. at 67. 
155 Vatterott Education Holdings, Inc. is a private equity owned corporation with an 
enrollment of 11,200 in fall 2010.  Id. at 23. 
156 Id. at 58. 
157 Brian A. Jacob & Tamara Wilder, Educational Expectations and Attainment 18 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15683, 2010) (“The fact that most 
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of higher education failure is the non-completion of a degree or 
certification program after having acquired student loan debt.  This form 
of failure is observed in all sectors of higher education, but it is 
particularly endemic to the for-profit sector. 
 
In programs of two years or less,158 the for-profit sector leads all others 
with a 60% completion rate.159  Among private and public institutions, the 
rate was 51% and 20% respectively.160  At the bachelor’s degree level, 
however, the for-profit sector had, by far, the lowest completion rate—
28%, compared to 65% for private institutions and 56% for publics.161  
Attainment trends reflect in some part the type of student an institution 
serves.  Disparities along racial and ethnic as well as socioeconomic lines 
have been observed throughout higher education.162  So an argument could 
be made that the comparatively woeful bachelor’s completion rates within 
the for-profit sector are a reflection of the type of student it targets.  In 
fact, public institutions with open admission policies, similar to those used 
by for-profit schools, have a comparably low average graduation rate of 
29%.163  So the outcomes observed among for-profit colleges are, in part, 
the result of larger factors that affect higher education overall.   
 
The effects of higher education failure, however, are more debilitating for 
students who attend for-profits institutions.  These schools tend to be 
relatively expensive, especially when compared to public schools, and 
reliance on student loans is greater among their students.  At $28,805, the 
average cost of attendance for a for-profit associate’s or certificate 
program is the highest among all institution types, almost double the 
public (in-state) average.164  For bachelor’s degree programs, for-profit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
students attain less education than they expect . . . suggests that misinformation is the 
cause of the gap.”). 
158 These programs typically award associate’s degrees and vocational certificates. 
159 SUSAN AUD, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2012, AT 
108 (2012). (listing overall rate of 30%).  See, also, id. (“The graduation rate was 
calculated as the total number of students who completed a degree within 150 percent of 
the normal time to degree attainment.”).	  
160 Id.  
161 Id. (listing the overall rate of 58%). 
162 For example, students of Asian/Pacific Islander descent have a bachelor’s degree 
graduation rate of 69% (the highest rate) while black students and Native American 
students graduate at a rate of 39% each. Id.  See, also, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES, 
PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS: POORER STUDENT OUTCOMES AT SCHOOLS THAT RELY MORE 
ON FEDERAL STUDENT AID 3 (1997) (documenting a negative association between 
reliance on federal financial aid and completion rates). 
163 AUD, ET AL., supra note 159, at 108 (highlighting the association between institutional 
selectivity and graduation rates). 
164 The in-state average among public institutions is $15,278; the private school average 
is $25,773.  These figures assume that the student is living off campus and not with 
family members.  Id. at 99. 
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schools are more expensive than public schools, but less expensive than 
privates.165  These trends, once again, reflect the lower levels of revenue 
diversification within the for-profit sector, particularly the absence of 
public appropriations and endowment income.  
 
Cost trends among for-profit schools collide with the socioeconomic 
demographics of their students—and the result is the highest average 
student loan debt in higher education.  For starters, students at for-profit 
institutions take out student loans at a higher proportion than students at 
any other type of school.  Eighty-six percent (86%) of full-time for-profit 
bachelor’s degree students borrowed money for school, compared to 63% 
and 50% of students at private and public schools respectively.166  Other 
data that includes part-time students and all program types assert a 
whopping 96% borrowing rate for students at for-profit schools.167     
 
Students at for-profit schools also borrow the most money—on average, 
$8,035 per year for associate’s degree and certificate students and $9,641 
for bachelor’s degree students.168  Unsurprisingly, graduates of for-profit 
schools are most likely to be “high debt borrowers,” defined as having 
debt loads exceeding $30,000.169  A majority (54%) of for-profit 
bachelor’s degree holders graduated at the high-debt level, compared to a 
quarter of degree-holders from private institutions and just 12% from 
public institutions.170  The trend held at the associate’s level as well.171  
But the real fallout occurs when students borrow money for school, but 
fail to complete the program.   
 
A recent study concluded that 86% of for-profit program non-completers 
acquired federal student loan debt.172  For 31% of that number, their debt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 At $40,148, private institutions have the highest average bachelor’s degree cost of 
attendance.  The costs at for-profit and public institutions are $29,114 and $21,665 
respectively. These figures assume that the student is living off campus and not with 
family members.  Id. 
166 Id. at 100. 
167 Based on this data, borrowing rates were 57% and 48% among bachelor’s degree 
students at private and public institutions respectively and 13% among community 
college students. HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 112.  
168 AUD, ET AL., supra note 159, at 101. 
169 REBECCA HINZE-FIFER & RICHARD FRY, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, THE RISE OF 
COLLEGE STUDENT BORROWING 6 (2010), 
http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/social-trends-2010-student-borrowing.pdf.  
170 Id. 
171 At the associate’s level, seventeen percent (17%) of graduates of for-profits schools 
were high-debt borrowers, compared to 12% and 2% among private and public institution 
graduates respectively.  Id. 
172 Among public institutions, 25% of students who failed to complete a 2-year program 
took out federal loans; the rate was 54% among students who left 4-year schools.  For 
private schools, the rate was 66%.  CHRISTINA CHANG WEI & LAURA HORN, FEDERAL 
STUDENT LOAN DEBT BURDEN OF NONCOMPLETERS 7 (2013), 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/2013155.pdf. 
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was equal to or exceeded their income.173  In other words, out of every 100 
for-profit school non-completers, 86 left with federal loans, and, for 27, 
that debt was at least as high as their income.  These figures are highest 
among all institution types.  For-profit non-completers also borrowed 
more per credit than all other students, including other non-completers.174  
Non-completers tend to make less money and have higher unemployment 
rates,175 with both trends affecting their ability to repay their loans.  
According to the latest data, almost 23% of former for-profit students 
(including completers) defaulted on federal loans within three years of 
entering repayment, compared to 11% and 7.5% of former students from 
public and private schools respectively.176   
 
As guarantors of federal student loans, taxpayers are collectively 
responsible for covering these defaults.  In fact, when you consider the 
total of investment of taxpayer money in higher education, including grant 
programs, it becomes clear that “American taxpayers are the single biggest 
investor in for-profit colleges,”177 as well as significant investors in higher 
education overall.178  Therefore, there is significant need for the 
discouragement of higher education recruitment deception, given its 
contributions to higher education failure and the resulting public costs.   
 
PART IV: LIMITED PATHS TO REDRESS 
 
Financial penalties can be effective at discouraging unscrupulous 
behavior.  Unfortunately, the potential penalties for higher education 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Among public institutions, 7% of students who failed to complete a 2-year program 
had federal student loan debt that exceeded their income; the rate was 13% among 
students who left 4-year schools.  For private schools, the rate was 21%.  Id. at 12. 
174 Non-completers across all institution types borrowed more per credit than completers, 
with for-profit non-completers far exceeding all others having borrowed $350 per credit.  
Among public institutions, non-completers of 2-year programs borrowed $80 per credit 
and 4-year program non-completers borrowed $130 per credit.  Private school non-
completers borrowed $190 per credit.  Id. at 9.   
175 See, e.g. id. at 10 (finding higher unemployment rates among non-completers across 
all institution types when compared to completers, as well as lower annual income for 
non-completers, except among those who left for-profit schools, who were found to make 
slightly more than completers).  See, also, e.g. MARY NGUYEN, DEGREELESS IN DEBT: 
WHAT HAPPENS TO BORROWERS WHO DROP OUT 5 (2013), 
http://www.educationsector.org/sites/default/files/publications/DegreelessDebt_CYCT_R
ELEASE.pdf (finding that certificate program completers had higher unemployment rates 
than non-completers overall, but for-profit non-completers had the highest unemployment 
rate).   
176 U.S. Dep’t of Educ., FY 2009 Official National 3-Year Cohort Default Rates (2012), 
http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/cdrschooltype3yr.pdf. 
177 HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 15 (“For-profit colleges now collect almost 25 percent 
of total Federal student aid money…over a third of GI bill education benefits to veterans, 
and half of all active duty servicemember tuition assistance dollars.”).  
178 Id. at 24 (noting that the federal government disbursed more than $130 billion in 
higher education loans and grants, with the for-profit sector collecting $32 billion).  
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recruitment deception lack any real discouraging effect.  As mentioned 
earlier, paths to redress for victims of this deception are largely unviable.  
And even though attempts have been made to strengthen administrative 
and regulatory oversight, penalties for unscrupulous behavior remain 
weak. 
 
A. The Triad 
 
The regulatory framework governing institutions eligible to collect federal 
financial aid funds is often referred to as “the triad.”179  The components 
of the triad—accrediting agencies, states, and the federal government—are 
charged with ensuring that “schools are meeting the basic guarantees of 
academic quality and fiscal soundness, and that they are complying with 
pertinent State and Federal laws.”180 
 
1. Accrediting Agencies 
 
In order to collect federal financial aid funds, schools must typically be 
accredited by an organization recognized by ED to perform academic and 
fiscal assessments of higher education institutions.181  These private, not-
for-profit agencies “develop evaluation criteria and conduct peer 
evaluations to assess whether or not those criteria are met.”182  Given their 
function, these agencies essentially serve as “gatekeepers” to the federal 
financial aid system.183  Their seals of approval can mean the difference 
between viability and death for institutions.   
 
Unfortunately, these agencies have historically done little to protect 
students from recruitment deception.  Federal law grants institutions wide 
latitude in defining their own missions and, as a result, dictating the 
standards by which they are judged.184  This latitude is a reflection of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 See, e.g., id. at 122. 
180 Id. 
181 Private regional and national accrediting organizations provide the bulk of higher 
education accreditation; however, ED also recognizes state agencies for purposes of 
accrediting public vocational education programs.  Regulations of the Offices of the 
Department of Education, 34 C.F.R. § 603.2 (2012), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-title34-vol3/pdf/CFR-2012-title34-vol3.pdf.  
Pre-accredited not-for-profit institutions, those deemed by an accrediting agency to be 
making timely progress towards accreditation, are allowed to collect federal financial aid 
funds as well.  See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 600.4.  See, also, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Financial Aid 
for Postsecondary Students: Accreditation in the United States, 
http://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/index.html [Hereinafter U.S. Accreditation] 
(Click on link titled, “Accrediting Agencies Recognized for Title IV Purposes,” to view 
list of agencies recognized to accredit institutions for purposes of federal financial aid). 
182 U.S. Accreditation, supra note 181. 
183 HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 122. 
184 20 USCS § 1099b (5) (A) (requiring accreditation agencies to assess an institution’s 
“student achievement in relation to the institution's mission” and allowing the imposition 
of “different standards for different institutions or programs”). 
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vast diversity of institutions and the resulting infeasibility of most one-
size-fits-all approaches.  Thus, a school with dismal outcomes, 
exacerbated by unscrupulous admissions practices, is at little risk of facing 
significant accreditation sanctions.185   
 
Agencies are engaging in new attempts at holding schools accountable for 
student outcomes.  As the president of the Western Association of Schools 
and Colleges (WASC)186 recently remarked, “accreditation needs to be 
more responsive…to the public’s demands for more accountability.  The 
times have changed.  People need to know more.”187  Motivated by the 
changing times, WASC has imposed new standards, premised on making 
published data more useful and transparent.  For example, WASC now 
requires schools to disaggregate outcomes data by “racial, ethnic, gender, 
age, economic status, disability, and other categories, as appropriate,” so 
as to highlight demographic disparities.188  But, hamstrung by federal law, 
the standards still allow institutions to benchmark their outcomes “against 
[their] own aspirations as well as the rates of peer institutions.”189 
   
The Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and Schools 
(ACICS)190  has revamped its standards many times in recent years to 
reflect the national trend toward outcomes-based assessment.  It measures 
institutional effectiveness along six outcomes-based indicators, including 
retention, placement, graduate satisfaction, employer satisfaction, learning 
objectives, and graduation rates.191  But again, no tangible standards 
around those outcomes are imposed.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 See, e.g., HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 127 (illustrating how a school with rapid 
growth and dismal retention rates, characteristics of a “churn and burn” admissions 
operation, could nonetheless receive a favorable accreditation assessment).  But, see 
Allison Sherry, Westwood College’s Main Denver Campus Placed on Probation by 
National Accrediting Body, THE DENVER POST, Sept. 21, 2010, available at 
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_16129512. 
186 WASC is one the six regional accrediting agencies.  The agency accredits institutions 
in California and Hawaii, the territories of Guam, American Samoa, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Republic of Palau, Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands, the 
Pacific Basin, and East Asia, and areas of the Pacific and East Asia.  Western Assoc. of 
School and Colleges (2013), http://www.wascweb.org/. 
187 Eric Kelderman, Accreditors Examine Their Flaws as Cals for Change Intensify, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 13, 2011, available at 
http://chronicle.com/article/Accreditors-Examine-Their/129765/. 
188 WASC: ACCREDITING COMM. FOR SENIOR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, 2013 
HANDBOOK OF ACCREDITATION 14 (2013), 
http://www.wascsenior.org/files/penultimatedrafthandbookv2.1.pdf. 
189 Id. 
190 ACICS bill itself as “the largest national accrediting organization of degree granting 
institutions.”  It accredits professional, technical, and occupational programs. Accrediting 
Council for Independent Colleges and Schools, About ACICS (2010, 
http://www.acics.org/. 
191 ACCREDITING COUNCIL FOR INDEPENDENT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, 
ACCREDITATION CRITERIA: POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND STANDARDS 38 (2013), 
http://www.acics.org/accreditation/content.aspx?id=3822. 
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Critics of the accreditation framework assert that agencies face an inherent 
conflict of interest, given that their existence is financed by the very 
schools they are responsible for assessing.192  Worsening matters is a 
competitive accreditation market where schools are sometimes free to 
cherry pick agencies with the laxest standards, thereby disincentivizing 
accreditation rigor.193  Whatever the reason, accrediting agencies provide 




State oversight can take many forms.  They are required by HEA to legally 
authorize the colleges and universities within their borders,194 and most do 
so through a public agency.195  These agencies are required to have “a 
process to review and appropriately act on complaints concerning the 
institution.”196  States also have consumer protections statutes and related 
agencies that can serve as complaint portals for victims of recruitment 
deception.   
 
States have made some attempts at protecting students.  Keiser College197 
recently entered into an Assurance of Voluntary Compliance (AVC) with 
the State of Florida after the Attorney General filed suit accusing the 
school of various violation of the state’s consumer protection laws.198  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 124 (likening the fee arrangements under which 
accreditation agencies operate to those of “Wall Street credit agencies that rubber-
stamped mortgage-backed securities and other instruments that later incurred large 
losses”). 
193 Id. (“If a particular accrediting agency gets a reputation for being too tough, schools 
can opt for other, more lenient accreditors.”).  
194 See, e.g., id. at 127. 
195 See, e.g., State Higher Education Executive Officers Assoc., SHEEO Members, 
http://www.sheeo.org/our-members (providing links to state higher education oversight 
agencies).   
196 34 C.F.R. § 600.9.  See, also, STATE HIGHER EDUCATION EXECUTIVE OFFICERS 
ASSOC., SHEEO STATE AUTHORIZATION SURVEY: STUDENT COMPLAINT INFORMATION 
BY STATE AND AGENCY (2012), 
http://www.sheeo.org/sites/default/files/Complaint%20Process%20Links%2012-
2012.pdf (providing links to student complaint portals for almost every state higher 
education oversight agency). 
197 Keiser was a for-profit institution before becoming a nonprofit institution in 2011, 
after being purchased by Everglades University, a Florida-based nonprofit institution.  
Scott Travis, Keiser University Celebrates 35th Year by Becoming a Nonprofit, 
SUNSENTINEL, Sept. 12, 2011, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-09-12/news/fl-keiser-
anniversary-20110912_1_keiser-university-scholarship-fund-evelyn-keiser. 
198 State of Florida, Office of Attorney General, In the Investigation of Keiser University, 
et al., No. L10-3-1201, at 1 (2012), available at 
http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/WF/JMEE-8ZLPRT/$file/KeiserUniversity.pdf 
(“The Department has investigated allegation that Respondents made certain 
misrepresentations, misleading statement or otherwise omitted or failed to disclose 
material information.”). 
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Pursuant to the AVC, the school agreed to comply with various disclosure 
directives, including disclosing information “clearly and conspicuously” to 
prospective students.199  The Colorado Attorney General recently settled a 
consumer protection suit against Westwood College200 for $4.5 million.  
The suit alleged that Westwood had “[misled] prospective students, 
engag[ed] in deceptive advertising and fail[ed] to comply with Colorado’s 
consumer lending laws.”201  Kentucky202 and Illinois203 have also filed 
consumer protection suits against schools arising out of alleged 
recruitment and marketing improprieties. 
 
The problem with state oversight, however, is that it is often inconsistent 
and sometimes “anemic.”204  Budget cuts and seeming conflicts of 
interests have significantly reduced the investigative and enforcement 
power of some state oversight agencies.205  There has been much concern 
on the part of ED that states have deferred to accrediting agencies on 
issues of oversight, thereby lessening the effectiveness of the triad.206  
Consumer protection statutes provide private rights to sue, which could be 
useful to victims of recruitment deception.  But formidable standards of 
proof (discussed in more detail later) often forestall any real prospect of 
redress. 
 
3. Federal Government 
 
The Higher Education Act gives ED broad responsibility in regulating 
higher education.  ED’s primary higher education functions are to certify 
and regulate accrediting agencies, administer the disbursal of federal 
financial aid,207 determine institutional eligibility to collect federal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 Id. at 4. 
200 Alta Colleges, Inc., Westwood’s parent company, had an enrollment of 19,190 in fall 
2010, and in 2009 had an overall student withdrawal rate of 58% from its Associate’s 
degree programs and 57% among its Bachelor’s degree enrollment.  HELP REPORT, 
supra note 8, at 215.   
201 Attorney General, Colorado Dep’t of Law, Attorney General Announces $4.5 million 




202 See, e.g., Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Conway Files Suit against 
Daymar College, Kentucky.gov (Jul. 27, 2011), 
http://migration.kentucky.gov/newsroom/ag/daymarsuit. 
203 Illinois Attorney General, Madigan Sues National For-Profit College (Jan. 18, 2011), 
http://www.ag.state.il.us/pressroom/2012_01/20120118.html. 
204 Benjamin Lesser & Greg B. Smith, As Complaints Mount, Anemic State Agency 
Overwhelmed by Job of Policing For-Profit Schools, NY DAILY NEWS, Jan. 18, 2011, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/complaints-mount-anemic-state-agency-
overwhelmed-job-policing-for-profit-schools-article-1.149897. 
205 HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 130. 
206 Association of Private Sector Colleges and Universities, No. 11-5174, at 50. 
207 34 C.F.R. § 602.1.  
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financial aid,208 serve as a source of information for the public,209 and 
promote federal priorities.210   
 
ED requires institutions to “make available” certain data to prospective 
and enrolled students.211  Among the data required to be disclosed are 
retention and completion data,212 job placement rates,213 and costs of 
attendance.214  The premise of these requirements is clear: to help students 
make better educational choices.  But a recent report found many colleges 
to be out of compliance with the requirements.215  The report also 
criticized the statute, arguing that “flaws in the way the statute was written 
[has] rendered much of the information all but useless.”216  For example, 
almost 20% of sampled institutions failed to publish or otherwise provide 
placement data, and even among institutions that were in compliance, 
variable presentation formats (allowed by “loose” federal mandates) 
rendered much of the information unhelpful, if not misleading.217  
 
ED regulations ban the use of “substantial” misrepresentations by 
institutions collecting federal financial aid.218  Misrepresentation is 
defined as “any false, erroneous or misleading statement” made by an 
institution or the institution’s representative.219  A misrepresentation is 
rendered “substantial” when “the person to whom it was made could 
reasonably be expected to rely, or has reasonably relied, to that person’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 For example, ED calculates student loan default rates in determining whether schools 
remain eligible to collect federal student aid, irrespective of whether they remain 
accredited.  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., COHORT DEFAULT RATE GUIDE 2.4-1 (2012), 
http://ifap.ed.gov/DefaultManagement/guide/attachments/CDRGuideCh2Pt4CDREffects.
pdf. 
209 For example, ED publishes an array of data about educational institutions that collect 
federal financial aid.  U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
System, http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/. 
210 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2011-2014 7 
(2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/strat/plan2011-14/plan-2011.pdf (“This 
[Strategic] Plan lays out a strategy that ties the day-to-day work of the Department to 
accomplishing the President’s 2020 Goal.”) 
211 34 C.F.R. § 668.41. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 34 C.F.R. § 668.43 (including tuition and fees, books and supplies, room and board, 
transportation, and other relevant costs). 
215 KEVIN CAREY & ANDREW P. KELLY, THE TRUTH BEHIND HIGHER EDUCATION 




217 Id. at 8 (“Disclosure requirements for “placement in employment” are loose enough to 
allow…institutions of all types…to promote success stories and hide the areas where they 
fall short.”) 
218 34 C.F.R. § 668.71. 
219 Id. 
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detriment.”220  The ban applies to “marketing, advertising, recruiting or 
admissions services” and covers misrepresentations made regarding “the 
nature of [an institution’s] educational program, its financial charges, or 
the employability of its graduates.”221  A school that violates the ban can 
have its financial aid eligibility restricted or suspended or be fined up to 
$27,500 per violation.222  
 
To facilitate the reporting of recruitment deception and other 
improprieties, ED provides an online form through which anyone can 
lodge a complaint.223  Unfortunately, the investigation of recruitment 
deception does not appear to be a priority.224  The following quote sums 
up the shortcomings of ED’s oversight in this area: 
 
For schools, there are few disincentives to engage in deceptive or 
fraudulent behavior when enrolling students.  The maximum fine 
imposed by the ED for a “substantial” misrepresentation is…a 
nominal amount in the grand scheme of things.  ED can strip a 
school of its federal financial aid eligibility, but is reluctant to 
pursue such sanctions, even when appropriate.  Making matters 
worse, [a Government Accountability Office] study found the ED’s 
methods of detecting some forms of noncompliance with financial 
aid rules to be inadequate.225  
 
There is also some question about whether the savviest acts of deception 
would even fall under the purview of the ban.  Does attempting to 
understate program costs by quoting tuition rates on a per term basis 
amount to a substantial misrepresentation if the quoted rate is accurate?  
Such a statement may be seen as misleading, but that conclusion would 
certainly be debatable in a legal context.  And because misrepresentations 
take the form of statements, the ban does not apply to a refusal to quote a 
tuition rate at all, even if the intent is to deceive by omission. 
  
ED has recognized that its regulations are “too lax,” and in recent years 
has attempted to broaden provisions and clear up ambiguities in ways that 
it believes will aid enforcement.226  ED sought to implement “gainful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
222 Id.  See, also, 34 C.F.R. § 668.84 (describing fine proceedings). 
223 U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office of the Inspector General: Complaint Form, 
https://wdcrobcolp01.ed.gov/CFAPPS/OIG/englishhotlineform.cfm. 
224 Anti-Fraud Hearings, supra note 151, at 23 (“The Department does not investigate 
charges made by students regarding misrepresentations made to influence students to 
enroll.”). 
225 Aaron N. Taylor, Undue Hardship: An Objective Approach to Discharging Federal 
Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 38 J.Leg. 185, 214 (2012). 
226 Association of Private Sector Colleges and Universities, No. 11-5174, at 3. 
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employment” standards,227 broaden the definition of “misrepresentation,” 
eliminate all safe harbors, or exceptions, to the incentive compensation 
ban, and require states to have a process for handling complaints against 
schools as part of their authorization responsibilities.228  These new 
regulations were challenged in two court cases brought by the Association 
of Private Sector Colleges and Universities (APSCU)—an association of 
for-profit education providers. 
 
a. Defining Gainful Employment 
 
Federal law requires that all educational programs offered by for-profit 
institutions and vocational programs offered by not-for-profit institutions 
“prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation.”229  
Congress, however, failed to define or explain the hallmarks of gainful 
employment.230  So in 2010, ED attempted to add an element of specificity 
to the concept.231  Specifically, ED sought to impose three regulations; 232 
the most significant promulgated two tests—one that used debt-to-income 
ratios and another that used student loan repayment rates—to measure 
whether a program was in compliance with the gainful employment 
requirement.233  If, after application of these tests, a program was deemed 
out of compliance with gainful employment dictates, it could have its 
financial aid eligibility restricted or revoked, and it could be required to 
provide disclaimers to students.234   
 
Pursuant to APSCU’s challenge, the student loan repayment test was 
vacated after the court concluded ED employed an arbitrary eligibility 
threshold.235  This conclusion prompted the court to also vacate the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 See, e.g., Association of Private Sector Colleges and Universities v. Duncan, No. 11-
1314 (D. D.C. Jun. 30, 2012), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2011cv01314/149271/25/0.pdf?1341123682 
(explaining ED’s attempts to impose gainful employment standards).   
228 See, e.g., Association of Private Sector Colleges and Universities, No. 11-5174 
(explaining ED’s attempts to broaden “misrepresentation” definition, eliminate safe 
harbors, and require state grievance processes). 
229 34 C.F.R. § 668.8.   
230 Association of Private Sector Colleges and Universities, No. 11-1314, at 16. 
231 Id. at 17 (“The means of determining whether a program ‘prepare[s] students for 
gainful employment in a recognized occupation’ is a considerable gap, which the 
Department has promulgated rules to fill.”) 
232 One regulation sought to measure whether a program was providing gainful 
employment to former students; the second created the mandate for schools to report 
income and debt statistics to ED; the final measure required schools to submit new 
programs to ED for approval based on gainful employment dictates.  Association of 
Private Sector Colleges and Universities, No. 11-1314, at 1. 
233 Id. at 13 (providing a detailed explanation of both tests).   
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 31 (“Because the Department has not provided a reasonable explanation [for the 
student loan repayment eligibility threshold], the court must conclude that it was chosen 
arbitrarily.”) 
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otherwise appropriate debt-to-income test (and the entire regulation), due 
to its lack of severability from the student loan repayment test.236  This 
decision forestalled a significant attempt by ED to ensure that programs 
were showing some form of payoff for students.  Fortunately, ED has 
taken steps to promulgate new regulations that would pass judicial 
review.237 
 
b. Broadening Misrepresentation 
 
ED sought to change the definition of misrepresentation in a way that 
would encompass any statement pertaining to an institution, rather than 
only those pertaining to an educational program, its financial charges, the 
employability of graduates, and a fourth topic that ED added—“the 
institution’s relationship with [ED].”238  Pursuant to APSCU’s challenge, 
the revision was deemed overly broad, encompassing misrepresentations 
not covered by the HEA.239  Similarly, ED sought to broaden the 
definition of misrepresentation to encompass confusing statements, such 
as per term tuition quotes.240  Once again, a court held that the change 
“exceed[ed] the HEA’s limits,”241 and raised First Amendment 
concerns.242  
 
c. Eliminating Safe Harbors 
 
ED’s decision to eliminate the incentive compensation safe harbors was 
mostly upheld.  Pursuant to APSCU’s challenge, a court requested 
clarifications regarding two issues prompted by the eliminations, but 
stopped short of halting their imposition.243  The court also upheld ED’s 
requirement that states establish a complaint grievance process as part of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 Id. at 32 (“The tests are obviously “intertwined”—and so the court cannot sever one 
from the others.”). 
237 Negotiated Rulemaking Committee; Public Hearings, 78 Fed. Reg. 22,467 (Apr. 16, 
2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-04-16/pdf/2013-08891.pdf 
(announcing the intent to inform a negotiated rulemaking committee that will attempt to 
draft new gainful employment regulations).  
238 Association of Private Sector Colleges and Universities, No. 11-5174, at 34. 
239 Id. at 35. 
240 Id. at 36. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 37.  See, also, id. at 44 (affirming the constitutionality of ED’s proscription of 
misrepresentations made in the form of commercial speech).  
243 One of the eliminated safe harbors allowed admissions officers to be paid based on the 
number of students who completed their educational programs or who were successfully 
retained beyond the first academic year of enrollment.  This safe harbor struck the court 
as an ideal incentive, given the goals of the HEA, and the court found ED’s justification 
for its elimination lacking.  The court was also dissatisfied with ED’s response to a 
question regarding the effect of the elimination on diversity outreach.  Without better 
explanations, ED’s elimination of the safe harbors would be “arbitrary and capricious.”  
However, the court did not foresee ED having a difficult time meeting the burden of 
explanation.  Id. at 28. 
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their responsibility to authorize schools within their borders.244  There is 
some reason for optimism regarding the extent to which these new 
regulations will remove some, though not all, disincentives to recruitment 
deception. 
 
Irrespective of attempts at improving the effectiveness of the triad, the 
regulatory system provides few disincentives to unscrupulous behavior in 
the admissions process and virtually no paths to redress for victims of this 
behavior.  And unfortunately, when victims bring lawsuits, they find that 
courtroom relief is fleeting as well. 
 
B. False Claims Act 
 
As mentioned earlier, the federal False Claims Act allows private 
individuals with personal knowledge of fraud against the federal 
government to bring suit against alleged defrauders in the name of the 
government.  The purpose of the Act is to incentivize whistleblowing by 
allowing whistleblowers to share in any monetary recovery they secure.  
Twenty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and a handful of 
municipalities have similar statutes on the books, though many of these 
laws are applicable only to Medicaid fraud.245 
 
Individuals bringing False Claims suits against educational institutions 
have had some success winning monetary recoveries.246  Most notably, the 
University of Phoenix agreed to pay the federal government $67.5 million 
to settle a False Claims case alleging violations very similar to those made 
in U.S. v. Education Management Corp.247  The whistleblowers in that 
case received $19 million for their efforts.   
 
But while False Claims Acts seem to provide potent deterrents to 
fraudulent behavior by schools, they still represent a relatively novel way 
of disincentivizing this behavior.  In the last 14 years, less than fifty of 
these cases have been filed in federal court.248  But more significantly, 
False Claims statutes do little to empower the non-governmental, private 
victims of fraudulent behavior.  When a monetary recovery is secured, it is 
the defrauded governmental entity and the individuals bringing the case 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Id. at 49 (citing ED’s concern about “the historical lack of state oversight”).  See, also, 
id. at 55 (vacating new requirements for state authorization on online programs, due to 
ED’s failure to follow rulemaking procedure). 
245 Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund, States With False Claims Acts, 
http://www.taf.org/states-false-claims-acts. 
246 See, also, Gibson Dunn, supra note 13 (providing a list of False Claims cases filed 
since 1999). 
247 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, University of Phoenix Settles False Claims Act Lawsuit for 
$67.5 Million, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/December/09-civ-1345.html. 
248 See, also, Gibson Dunn, supra note 13. 
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(who in many cases aided the fraud) who benefit.  Private victims do not 
share in that windfall. 
 
C. Contract Law 
 
Students have a contractual relationship with their higher education 
institutions.249  Promises made by school officials and rights and 
responsibilities embodied in school policies can form the basis of the legal 
relationship,250 at least if they are sufficiently specific.251  If an admissions 
officer promises a prospective student a particular educational outcome 
(e.g. employment upon graduation), and in reliance upon that promise, the 
student enrolls, the student would have a viable breach of contract claim if 
the promise is unfulfilled.   
 
The viability of a breach of contract action turns on an alleged promise’s 
specificity.  If the student can “point to an identifiable contractual promise 
that the defendant failed to honor,” her claim will be heard on the merits 
and possibly be successful.252  Claims based on promises that are less than 
“reasonably certain” would likely be dismissed for failing to “provide a 
basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an 
appropriate remedy.”253  Allegations about program quality are typically 
not actionable in a breach of contract suit,254 even though admissions 
officers often base their pitch on quality-based assertions.   
 
This judicial posture leaves much room for unscrupulous admissions 
officers to operate.  Vague assurances do not carry the same legal 
consequences, even though they can have the same inducing effect on the 
prospective student.  Similarly, claims based on puffery are likely to be 
dismissed.255  
 
Contract law assumes arm’s length parties; therefore, there is typically no 
duty to disclose between parties.  However, courts have found such a duty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 See, e.g., Ross, 957 F.2d at 416. 
250 “The catalogues, bulletins, circulars, and regulations of the institution made available 
to the matriculant become a part of the contract.”  Id. 
251 Key v. Coryell, 185 S.W.3d 98, 104 (Ark. Ct. App. Jun. 2, 2004) (finding that the 
terms of a student handbook “were so vague and general that they are not enforceable”). 
252 Ross, 957 F.2d at 417. 
253 Key, 185 S.W.3d at 341. 
254	  Ross, 957 F.2d at XXX (“the plaintiff must do more than allege that the education was 
not good enough”).	  
255 For example, if an admissions officer promises that their school provides extensive 
career assistance to students, a plaintiff alleging that the services fell short of the promise 
would have to identify specific services that the school promised but completely failed to 
provide.  Allegations of inadequate quality are typically not actionable.  The result is that 
an admissions officer can extol with impunity non-existent virtues to prospective 
students, as long as her assertions remain just vague enough to avoid legal responsibility.  
See, e.g., Ross, 957 F.2d at 417.     
38 HIGHER EDUCATION SUCKER SALE [DATE] 
in several types of instances, including when the disclosure is required by 
law, regulation or longstanding precedent; when a party intentionally 
conceals information; when a party makes a partial, but not complete, 
disclosure; when a party makes a statement that he later finds out is 
untrue; and when there is a fiduciary or confidential relationship between 
the parties.256   
 
Some of these exceptions could form the theoretical basis of contract 
claim by a victim of recruitment deception.  However, the judicial 
precedent in this area is abundantly inconsistent, rendering it very difficult 
to assess when a duty of disclosure exists.257  And when the defendant is 
an educational institution, courts do not appear to be amenable to 
departing from the general rule.  
 
D. Tort Law 
 
The common tort theories—fraudulent misrepresentation and two 
negligence actions: negligent misrepresentation and educational 
malpractice—fail to provide much of a path to relief for victims of 
recruitment deception.   
 
1.  Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
 
In order to successfully claim fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff 
must prove, at minimum, that the defendant knowingly made a false or 
baseless representation regarding a material fact, on which the plaintiff 
reasonably relied to his detriment.258  Proving scienter—or intent to 
deceive—is difficult.259  Savvy deceivers rarely document their nefarious 
actions in ways that are amenable to legal liability.  In addition, allegations 
of fraud must be alleged with a level of specificity that is often difficult to 
present.260  Lastly, because opinions and puffery typically cannot form the 
basis of a misrepresentation claim,261 a plaintiff is unlikely to prove 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 JOHN D. CALAMARI, ET AL., CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS 302 (2011).	  
257 Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin 
of Omission: Testing the Meta-theories 1 (unpublished draft article) (2004), available at  
http://www.law.fsu.edu/faculty/2003-2004workshops/zieler.pdf (“Courts repeatedly 
reach divergent results in similar, or even seemingly identical, cases, and have failed to 
articulate a coherent or generally accepted rule as to when a duty of candor will be 
imposed on parties to an arm’s-length transaction.”) 	  
258 See, also, e.g., Brug v. Enstar Group, Inc., 755 F.Supp 1247, 1253 (D. Del. 1991) 
(listing elements of fraud). 
259 Hunter, 439 A.2d at 587.   
260 See, e.g., Jamieson, 473 F.Supp 2d at 1157 (holding that plaintiffs failed to sufficiently 
allege the content, time, place, or maker of the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations). 
261 See, e.g., Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal.2d 481, 489 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1954) (asserting that an 
opinion can become actionable as deceit only if “defendant held himself out as an expert, 
plaintiffs hired him to supply information concerning matters of which they were 
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fraudulent misrepresentation based on the type of vague assurances often 
used by admissions officers to induce enrollment.   
 
Reasonable reliance can be difficult to prove in the higher education 
context, due to the availability of relevant information.262  ED publishes 
various types of data about institutions that collect federal financial aid 
funds.  Relevant data is also published by accrediting agencies and other 
entities.263  This information can be relevant to the enrollment decision, 
but the information is underutilized, largely due to lack of awareness of its 
existence and lack of insight about how to interpret it.264  This information 
is unlikely to be helpful to many of the students who for-profit schools 
target; but its availability could nonetheless weaken a claim of reasonable 
reliance. 
 
2.  Negligence 
 
Causes of action based in negligence often fail due to the reluctance of 
courts to impose a duty of care upon educational institutions.  This 
reluctance forestalls most claims where a plaintiff alleges that his school is 
liable for his not attaining a certain educational outcome, such as 
employment upon graduation.265  The following illustrates one of the 
primary reasons courts have declined to impose this duty: 
 
Since education is a collaborative and subjective process whose 
success is largely reliant on the student, and since the existence of 
such outside factors as a student's attitude and abilities render it 
impossible to establish any quality or curriculum deficiencies as a 
proximate cause to any injuries, we rule that there is no workable 
standard of care here and defendant would face an undue burden 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ignorant, and his unequivocal statement necessarily implied that he knew facts that 
justified his statement”). 
262 See, e.g., Gomez-Jiminez et al. v. New York Law School et al., No. 2012-08819, slip 
op. at 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) (holding that plaintiffs failed to act as reasonable consumers 
in not considering data other than that which was presented by the law school).  
263 For example, in the realm of legal education, the American Bar Association and the 
Law School Admission Council jointly host a searchable database featuring data about 
every ABA accredited law school in the country.  Law School Admission Council, Inc., 
Official Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schools: State Map, 
https://officialguide.lsac.org/release/OfficialGuide_Default.aspx (last visited May 23, 
2013). 
264 BRIDGET TERRY LONG, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, GRADING HIGHER EDUCATION: 
GIVING CONSUMERS THE INFORMATION THEY NEED 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/12/pdf/longpaper.pdf (“[T]he process of 
college choice involves simultaneously ranking options in multiple ways, relying on 
incomplete and uncertain information, and receiving little or no support for interpreting 
the facts that are available.”). 
265 See, e.g., Jamieson, 473 F.Supp 2d at 1157 (“An inability to obtain suitable 
employment is not necessarily the result of poor education.  Efforts of an educational 
institution only go so far to ensure the success of its students.”). 
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if forced to litigate its selection of curriculum and teaching 
methods.266  
 
Therefore, if an admissions officer induces a prospective student to enroll 
based on puffery about the quality or career and financial benefits of an 
academic program, a negligence claim could succeed only if the 
representations took the form of a guarantee.  Any assertion short of that 
would be protected from legal liability by the “collaborative and 
subjective” nature of education and its outcomes. 
 
The absence of a duty of care is not the only reason why negligent 
misrepresentation and educational malpractice claims tend to fail.  
Negligent misrepresentation claims suffer from essentially the same issues 
as those brought in fraud,267 including the non-actionable nature of 
opinions and puffery and the effect of available information on the 
reasonableness of reliance.  In addition, a host of espoused public policy 
reasons prevent educational malpractice claims from surviving dismissal.  
Reasons include the “inherent uncertainties” in determining causation and 
damages, the potential flood of litigation that could overburden schools, 
and the traditional deference afforded schools to carry out their internal 
operations.268 
 
V: CONCEPTUALIZED TORT  
 
The inadequacies of the regulatory framework and the inequities of 
judicial treatment necessitate new approaches to protecting students from 
higher education recruitment deception.  Other articles have proposed new 
administrative and regulatory frameworks269 and new ways of 
conceptualizing contract law,270 but there is a dearth of discussion relating 
to tort law.  This article seeks to fill that void by conceptualizing a 
negligence theory that would protect students and disincentivize 
unscrupulous behavior in higher education admissions and recruitment.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 Tolman v. CenCor Career Colleges, Inc., 851 P.2d 203, 205 (Col. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 
1992). 
267 The fundamental difference between fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent 
misrepresentation is that the former requires intent to deceive or utter a baseless 
statement while the latter requires no intent, but requires a duty to communicate accurate 
information.  The intent requirement is essentially replaced by the duty of care.  
268 See, e.g., Ross, 957 F.2d at 414. 
269 See, e.g., Aaron N. Taylor, “Your Results May Vary”: Protecting Students and 
Taxpayers Through Tighter Regulation of Proprietary School Representations, 62 ADMIN 
L. REV. 729 (2010). 
270 See, e.g., Hazel Glenn Beh, Student Versus University: The University’s Implied 
Obligations of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 59 MD. L. REV. 183 (2000) (“The implied 
obligations of good faith and fair dealing hold the potential to define and to police the 
student-university relationship while avoiding the pitfalls of judicially second-guessing 
and intruding in the management of the institution or into its academic freedoms.”). 
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The theory, negligent educational recruitment, is an extension of negligent 
misrepresentation and, semantically, is based on the tort of Information 
Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others.271  Negligent 
educational recruitment is premised on the view that the core function of 
an admissions officer is that of counselor, and, therefore, the use of certain 
sales tactics and deception invokes potential legal liability.  Lastly, even 
though this discussion centers on admissions officers, the tort would 
potentially apply to any employee or contractor hired by an educational 
institution to recruit or enroll students.  Financial aid officers and even 
athletic team coaches would be examples. 
 
The fundamental purpose of torts is to “deter socially unreasonable 
conduct.”272  The determent is actualized by requiring tortfeasors to 
compensate victims of their wrongdoings, thereby, increasing the costs of 
tortious behavior.273  This understanding of tort law aligns with the 
corrective justice theory, which is based on the following premise: 
 
As a matter of individual justice between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, the defendant who has caused an injury to the plaintiff 
in violation of his rights in his person or property must compensate 
him for such injury.274  
 
In essence, a fair and effective system of corrective justice can be boiled 
down to three elements: 1) the consistent assignment of liability that is 
aligned with “moral norms of responsibility”; 2) the just compensation of 
victims of tortious behavior; 3) and an “internal” system of finance where 
the costs of compensation are borne by tortfeasors.275  The theory offered 
in this Part aligns liability for recruitment deception with norms 
underlying fairness, and seeks just compensation of victims of this 
deception by the institutions that perpetrate it.   
 
A. Negligent Educational Recruitment 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552.  Information Negligently Supplied for the 
Guidance of Others protects individuals from false information supplied by persons with 
whom they have no contractual privity.  Therefore, the tort is an expansion of traditional 
negligence theory, which requires privity.  This tort does not provide a direct analogy to 
the conceived tort of Negligent Educational Recruitment because I will argue that there is 
privity between admissions officers and the prospective students they advise.  
Nonetheless, the wording of the tort is instructive.  
272 Cohen, supra note 7 at 1307. 
273 Id. at 1326 (“Tort damages provide specific and general deterrence by motivating 
injurers to incorporate the cost of consequential losses into their behavioral decisions.”) 
274 Richard Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic 
Analysis, 14  J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (1985) [Hereinafter, Actual Causation].   
275 Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 
UCLA L. REV. 439, 450 (1990). 
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Negligent conduct is that “which falls below the standard established by 
law for the protection of others.”276  Negligence is an expansive concept 
that encompasses a wide range of human endeavors,277 including the 
provision of information to others.  The tort of negligent misrepresentation 
imposes a duty upon professional suppliers of information to communicate 
that information accurately.  The following quote explains the premise: 
 
A person in the profession of supplying information for the guidance of 
others acts in an advisory capacity and is manifestly aware of the use 
that the information will be put, and intends to supply it for that 
purpose.  Such a person is also in a position to weigh the use for the 
information against the magnitude and probability of the loss that 
might attend the use of the information if it is incorrect.278 
   
The conceptualized tort—negligent educational recruitment—is based 
heavily on the wording of the tort of Information Negligently Supplied for 
the Guidance of Others, a form of negligent misrepresentation, which 
dictates that: 
 
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, 
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, 
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their 
business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss 
caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if 
he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or 
communicating the information.279 
 
Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others has four 
essential elements: 1) the communication of false or inaccurate 
information, 2) by a person who is paid to supply information, 3) upon 
which the hearer of the information justifiably relies, 4) to his financial 
detriment.  In a nutshell, the tort protects hearers (in this case, third 
parties) of false or inaccurate representations made by people who should 
know what they are talking about.  These elements align with the three 
basic elements of negligence: duty, breach, and causation.  The duty arises 
out of the tortfeasor’s pecuniary interest in providing information.  The 
breach occurs when the tortfeasor communicates false information she 
should have known was false.  And the reasonable, detrimental reliance 
accounts for the causation.   
 
1. Duty of Care 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 760 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1992). 
277 Sain, 626 N.W.2d at 122 (“A cause of action for negligence may find support in most 
any conduct.”). 
278 Id. at 124. 
279 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552. 
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The nature of the relationship between parties determines the existence of 
a duty of care.  Such duty is commonly found when created by contract; 
“where there is a relationship of peculiar trust and confidence;” or when a 
relationship is typified by asymmetrical bargaining power or access to 
information.280  A “special relationship” is formed through these 
interactions, and that is from where the duty arises.  The nature of the 
relationship between admissions officers and prospective students is 
indeed “special,” in that it is very often based on peculiar trust and 
confidence and is typified by unequal bargaining power and access to 
information.   
 
The provision of information is one of the major functions of an 
admissions officer.  Each of the announcements described earlier placed 
an onus on the officer to be a source of information about program content 
and requirements, as well as the admissions process.  Put differently, 
admissions officers are paid to provide information.  Numerous courts 
have held that a pecuniary interest in providing information solidifies the 
special nature of a commercial relationship.281  In the education context, 
one court held that a high school counselor was “in the profession of 
supplying information to others” and, therefore, reasoned that the 
counselor had a duty to communicate accurate information to students.282 
 
In addition to relying on admissions officers for information, prospective 
students disclose personal information to these individuals.  The scope of 
the information is broad, encompassing past and present experiences and 
future aspirations.  The information is sometimes closely-held by the 
applicant, making disclosure to the admissions officer even more 
significant.  It is not uncommon for a prospective student to disclose how 
a difficult, if not painful, life experience motivates her to pursue the 
educational endeavor for which she is applying.  Some disclosures are 
required; others are motivated by the perception that the admissions 
officer is a counselor serving the applicant’s best interests.  Because of 
their significance, the disclosures are typically protected by institutional 
privacy policies.283  Therefore, the relationship between admissions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 Ellen Byers, Addressing the Consumer’s Worst Nightmare: Toward a More Expansive 
Development of the Law of Tortious Fraud and Deceptive Practices in Kansas, 38 
WASHBURN L.J. 455, 469 (1999). 
281 See, e.g., Sain, 626 N.W.2d at 124.  
282 Id. at 126. 
283 See, e.g., Bloomfield College, Undergraduate Application for Admission, 
http://www.bloomfield.edu/sites/default/files/common/Undergraduate_Degree_Applicati
on.pdf (“Bloomfield College’s policy is to protect the privacy of applicants.”) (last visited 
May 23, 2013).  See, also, e.g., LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, INC., LSAC 
STATEMENT OF GOOD ADMISSION AND FINANCIAL AID PRACTICES 3 (2012) 
http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/publications/pdfs/statementofgoodadm.pdf  
(recommending that law schools “be scrupulous in maintaining the privacy of 
applicants”). 
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counselor and prospective student is clearly peculiar in the extent to which 
prospects place their trust and confidence in admissions officers.284   
 
The relationship is also often typified by unequal access to information 
and unequal bargaining power.  Various forms of institutional information 
are publicly available, though it is underutilized and often inscrutable to 
many applicants.  But in spite of this access, admissions officers 
nonetheless maintain information advantages that give them the ability 
exercise undue influence.  An example is how admissions officers can 
exaggerating the scarcity of space in an entering class knowing that 
prospective students have no means of verification.  The bargaining 
disparity is made worse by the sales training that some admissions officers 
receive, which is intensified through excessive contact.  This dynamic 
allows for advantage-taking by unscrupulous admissions officers whose 
predominant focus is closing the deal.  And while such a result may be 
acceptable on a car lot, the stakes involved in the higher education context 




Behavior is deemed tortious by legislative or judicial action.  Both 
methods of deeming are typically the result of “social and moral 
requirements” that arise.285  Thus, behaviors that once carried no potential 
for legal liability are now considered tortious based on shifting societal 
norms.286  Judicial deeming serves as a flexible gap-filler in the absence of 
relevant legislative action.  Judges see unaddressed legal harms and 
fashion common law remedies.287  But irrespective of the method, societal 
norms necessitate that certain behaviors be deemed tortious within the 
context of higher education admissions. 
 
As argued earlier, contemporary pressures put admissions officers in the 
conflicting posture of having to serve as counselors while having to sell a 
product.  But given the wide-ranging stakes involved in a prospective 
student’s decision to pursue higher education,288 admissions officers must 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 See, e.g., Lewis v. Rosenfeld, 138 F. Supp. 2d 466, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“A 
commercial relationship may become a special relationship where the parties enjoy a 
relationship of trust and reliance closer than that of the ordinary buyer and seller.”). 
285 Cohen, supra note 7, at 1291. 
286 See, e.g., Seth E. Lipner & Lisa A. Catalino, The Tort of Giving Negligent Investment 
Advice, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 663, 665 (2009) (documenting the advent of the tort of 
negligent investment advice in response to the increased prominence of the investment 
industry).  
287 Cohen, supra note 7, at 1292 (“The creation of affirmative duties may reflect ad hoc 
moral judgments about what behavior warrant punishment even though it is unaddressed 
in the law.”). 
288 Stakes relate to actual and opportunity costs, chances of completion, chances of 
employment, and ability to repay student loans.  Some of these stakes are personal to the 
prospective student, but many of them have broader relevance. 
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fully embrace their counseling responsibility, to the exclusion of their 
sales role.  Therefore, many behaviors endemic to sales culture should be 
considered tortious in the higher education context.     
 
The general rule in misrepresentation cases is that “a person cannot 
misrepresent his own opinion,” therefore, only factual assertions are 
typically actionable.289  Some courts, however, have deemed opinions 
actionable when they are “not a causal expression of belief but a deliberate 
affirmation of the matters stated.”290  The negligent educational 
recruitment tort would embrace this approach.  The communication of not 
only false statements, but also opinions, puffery, or forward-looking 
statements would be considered potentially tortious.  Doing so would 
attach legal responsibility to the baseless, but legally vague assurances that 
admissions officers often use to induce enrollment.  Officers would think 
twice before assuring an applicant that he would have “no problem” 
achieving a certain outcome if such an assertion came with potential legal 
consequences. 
 
The Senate investigation found that for-profit schools also employ 
elaborate tactics and procedures for dealing with reluctance or 
hesitance.291  The danger of these tactics is that the applicant’s best 
interests are irrelevant.  Therefore, finding (and poking) the pain, 
inundating skeptical prospective students with contact, exaggerating the 
scarcity of space in the entering class, and other hard-sell tactics should be 
considered tortious.  In fact, in situations where a prospect has expressed a 
desire to no longer be considered for enrollment, any further contact 
should be considered tortious.  Such limitations already exist in the higher 
education context.   
 
The NCAA restricts the amount of contact school representatives can have 
with prospective athletes.  In addition to being subject to a broad 
definition of “contact,”292 these individuals are subject to an elaborate 
scheme of restrictions “designed in part to protect prospective student-
athletes from undue pressures that may interfere with their scholastic or 
athletic interest.”293     
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 Darst v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 716 N.E.2d 579, 584 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1999). 
290 Bily, 834 P.2d at 768. 
291 HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 63. 
292 The NCAA defines contact as:  
“[A]ny face-to-face encounter between a prospective student-athlete or the 
prospective student-athlete’s parents, relatives or legal guardians and an 
institutional staff member or athletics representative during which any dialogue 
occurs in excess of an exchange of a greeting.”  
2012-13 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 77 (2012), 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D113.pdf. 
293 Crue v. Aiken, 370 F.3d 668 (Ill. App. Ct. 7 Dist. 2004). 
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Such restrictions exist in other realms as well.  The American Bar 
Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct forbid lawyers 
from soliciting prospective clients after they have “made known to the 
lawyer a desire not to be solicited.”294  The Rule applies not only to 
situations where the prospect expressly makes her desire known, but also 
to situations where the client is unresponsive to the lawyer’s outreach.295  
Therefore, a lawyer who continues to contact a prospective client, even 
after receiving no response to earlier attempts, is potentially in violation of 
the ban.   
 
The Rule is intended to safeguard against the risk of abuse inherent in 
these interactions.  The asymmetric dynamic in the attorney-prospective 
client relationship is similar to the dynamic in the admissions officer-
prospective student relationship.  And the following recitation of the 
Rule’s premise could easily be applied to the higher education setting: 
 
The prospective client…may find it difficult fully to evaluate all 
available alternatives [for legal services] with reasoned judgment 
and appropriate self-interest in the face of the lawyer’s presence 
and insistence upon being retained immediately.  The situation is 
fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation, and 
over-reaching.296  
 
Hard-sell tactics place students at risk in much of the same way they place 
legal clients at risk.  Therefore, deeming these tactics to be tortious in the 
higher education context would prompt admissions officers to embrace 
their counselor role in a manner that would better serve students and 
taxpayers.  In alleging that tortious behavior has occurred, plaintiffs could 
provide documented evidence, such as telephone records and emails, as 
well as recitations of conversations.  Admissions training manuals, 
misleading commercials and marketing materials, internal emails, and 
other institutional documents could be used to bolster allegations as well. 
 
The level of detail required in pleadings is important because it greatly 
influences the odds of a plaintiff’s case surviving dismissal.  In pleading 
breach under the negligent educational recruitment theory, plaintiffs 
would be required to provide “a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that [they are] entitled to relief.”297  This pleading standard stops 
short of the more stringent “with particularity” standard that is applied in 
intentional misrepresentation cases and even some negligent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, 7.3(b) (1) (2013). 
295 Id. at, cmt. 5.  
296 Id. at, cmt. 1. 
297 See, e.g., Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d 824, 
833 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that in order to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation, 
plaintiff “must set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [it] is 
entitled to relief.").  
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misrepresentation cases.298  The purpose of imposing the lower standard is 




The causation analysis is framed around the question, “Did the tortious 
aspect of the defendant’s conduct contribute to an injury to the plaintiff’s 
person or property?”299  This analysis is “backward-looking, 
individualized, and factual.”300  The empirical nature of causation301 can 
make it difficult to determine, especially when there are many potential 
causes.302  This point is particularly salient in the education context.  As 
courts have noted, education is a collaborative process, with outcomes 
being influenced by a range of factors, related and unrelated to the actual 
education received.  The nature of the process makes determining 
causation difficult and serves as a justification for the narrow paths to 
redress discussed earlier.   
 
In creating a tort path, a test of causation must be identified that accounts 
for causal uncertainty in a manner that serves the fundamental purpose of 
discouraging socially unreasonable behavior.  The Necessary Element of a 
Sufficient Set (NESS) test of causation best serves this purpose.  NESS is 
based on the follow premise: 
 
A particular condition was a cause of a specific consequence if 
and only if it was a necessary element of a set of antecedent actual 
conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the 
consequence.303  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 There is a split among the judicial circuits regarding the level of detail required for 
plaintiffs to plead negligent misrepresentation.  For example, the 7th Circuit imposes the 
lower “short and plain statement” requirement while the 8th Circuit requires plaintiffs to 
“state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”  See, e.g., 
Trooien v. Mansour, 608 F.3d 1020, 1028 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Any allegation of 
misrepresentation, whether labeled as a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation or 
negligent misrepresentation, is considered an allegation of fraud which must be pled with 
particularity.”). 
299 Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk Probability, Naked Statistics, and 
Proof; Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IA. L. REV. 1001, 1004 
(1985) [Hereinafter, Bramble Bush].  	  
300 Actual Causation, supra note 274, at 437. 
301 Richard W. Wright, The NESS Account of Natural Causation: A Response to 
Criticisms, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION 286 (Richard Goldberg ed., 2011) 
[Hereinafter, The NESS Account]. 
302 See, e.g., Benjamin Shmueli & Yuval Sinai, Liability Under Uncertain Causation? 
Four Talmudic Answers to a Contemporary Tort Dilemma, 30 B.U. INT’L L. J. 449, 453 
(2012). 
303 Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1790 (1985) 
[Hereinafter, Causation in Tort Law].  NESS is described as “a test of weak necessity or 
strong sufficiency.”  In determining causation, such tests require that a condition be a 
necessary element of a set of actual or existing conditions necessary for the occurrence of 
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Therefore, pursuant to NESS, causation would be proven if a plaintiff 
could show that an admissions officer’s tortious conduct (a particular 
condition) was a cause of the plaintiff incurring expenses in an educational 
program in which he experienced an unfavorable outcome (specific 
consequence), because the plaintiff would not have enrolled in the 
program but for the tortious conduct (necessary element).  It is immaterial 
that other factors, such as family circumstances or lack of ability, also 
could have contributed to the undesirable outcome.  Causation is proven as 
long as the admissions officer’s tortious conduct was a “necessary 
element” among the “set of antecedent actual conditions” that led to the 
“specific consequence” of the undesirable outcome.  If the plaintiff would 
have enrolled in the program anyway, even in the absence of any tortious 
conduct, then no causation would be found.304 
 
A plaintiff’s reliance on the tortious conduct must be reasonable in order 
for causation to be found.  In the financial advising context, where the tort 
of Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others has been 
deemed actionable, the “sophistication of the plaintiff, the existence of 
disclaimers, and a defendant’s possession of unique or special expertise” 
are relevant to the reasonableness assessment.305  Sophisticated investors 
are held to a higher standard of reasonableness pursuant to an “enhanced 
duty to obtain material information.”306  Similar standards have been 
applied in the educational context.   
 
In dismissing misrepresentation claims against New York Law School 
(NYLS), the judge characterized prospective law students as “a 
sophisticated subset of education consumers, capable of sifting through 
data and weighing alternatives before making a decision regarding their 
post-college options.”307  The court opined further, “In these new and 
troubling times, the reasonable consumer of legal education must realize 
that…omnipresent realities…obviously trump any allegedly overly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the consequence.  In contrast, strict necessity tests require that the condition be necessary 
for the occurrence of the consequence, each time it occurs.  The most common tests of 
necessity are based on a strong-necessity premise that requires the condition be necessary 
for the occurrence of the consequence on that particular occasion.  The but-for test is a 
strong-necessity test.  In terms of sufficiency, weak-sufficiency tests require only that a 
condition be a part of some set of existing conditions that was sufficient to cause the 
consequence.  Bramble Bush, supra note 299, at 1020. 
304 Bramble Bush, supra note 299, at 1041 (explaining that the “obvious way” to 
determine causation using NESS is to eliminate the tortious conduct from the set of 
conditions and surmise whether the specific consequence would have nonetheless 
occurred).  
305 King County v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 863 F. Supp. 2d 288, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012). 
306 Maverick Fund, L.D.C. v. Comverse Technology, Inc., 801 F.Supp. 2d 41, 57 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
307 Gomez-Jiminez et al., No. 2012-08819, slip op. at 7. 
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optimistic claims in their law school’s marketing materials.”308  Because 
“measuring reasonableness is done in the context of circumstances,”309 the 
court’s conclusion could have been different had the plaintiffs been for-
profit school dropouts, instead of law school graduates.    
 
In applying these dictates to the tort of negligent educational recruitment, 
courts could consider a range of factors.  One such factor is the type and 
extent of the tortious behavior.  Exposure to a range of different or 
particularly sharp tactics could bolster a plaintiff’s case.  In addition, the 
plaintiff’s insight into higher education could be considered.  Put 
differently, was it reasonable for the plaintiff to be influenced by the 
tortious conduct?  A plaintiff with no higher education experience when 
exposed to the tortious conduct would have a stronger case than a plaintiff 
who already possessed a degree.  A plaintiff who was a first-generation 
college student would have a relatively strong case as well.  In addition, 
the person making the negligent representation would be important, as it is 
more reasonable to rely on the representations of, say, an admissions dean 
than it is a student recruiter. 
 
Length of enrollment in the program could be a factor as well, and indeed 
an effective limiting principle, with shorter periods of enrollment 
bolstering the plaintiff’s case.  A plaintiff who dropped out during his 
initial enrollment period would have a stronger argument for causation 
than a plaintiff who also enrolled in subsequent periods.  Similarly, the 
length of time between the plaintiff’s exposure to the tortious behavior and 
the plaintiff’s enrollment would be relevant.  A plaintiff who enrolled 
immediately after (or during) exposure would have a stronger case than a 
plaintiff who enrolled later. 
 
The availability of institutional information would be relevant, but 
plaintiffs would be allowed to rely on the representations of admissions 
officers regarding matters that are “peculiarly within [the officers’] 
knowledge,” without conducting investigations of their own.310  For 
example, students should not have to verify completion or employment 
data provided by admissions counselors.  This allowance is, once again, 
premised on the view that admissions officers must completely embrace 
their counseling responsibilities, especially in dealings with disadvantaged 
or vulnerable populations. 
 
NESS is a derivative of the seminal but-for test of causation.311  But 
implicit in NESS is an appreciation of the complex nature of the human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 Id. at 14. 
309 Id. at 17. 
310 Maverick Fund, L.D.C., 801 F.Supp. 2d at 57 (applying this standard in the investment 
context). 
311 The but-for test dictates that:  
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existence312 and a desire to discourage tortious behavior, even if the 
behavior was not the sole or predominant cause of an injury.313  NESS 
prevents tortious actors who cause, or contribute to, harm from using other 
potential causes to shield themselves from legal liability.  Such shielding 
not only leads to irrational outcomes,314 but also encourages tortious 
behavior by allowing it to go unpunished.  Applying NESS to recruitment 
deception would increase the chances that schools would be held 
accountable for tortious behavior and, as a result, incidences of deception 




In the context of tort law, a corrective system of justice requires that 
victims of tortious injuries be restored to their “pre-injury position” 
through compensation from the tortfeasor.315  Put simply, “if A 
appropriates X from B, corrective justice requires that he return or replace 
that commodity X.”316 Therefore, a means of determining damages in 
financial terms is essential.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“an act (omission, condition, etc.) was a cause of an injury if an only if, but for the 
act, the injury could not have occurred.  That is, the act must have been a necessary 
condition for the occurrence of the injury.”   
Causation in Tort Law, supra note 303, at 1775.  Id. at 1802 (explaining that when there 
is only one tortious cause of the injury, NESS test becomes a but-for test).   
312 Id. at 1824 (“It is unnecessary, even if possible, to explain a particular occurrence by 
detailing all the antecedent conditions.  As the precision and detail of the description of 
all the antecedent conditions increases, our ability to predict the effect improves.  Beyond 
a certain point, however, the explanatory force does not improve, but rather lessens as it 
increasingly becomes a description of a unique event rather than an instance of some 
broad generalization.”). 
313 “A condition can be a cause under the NESS test…even if it was neither necessary nor 
independently sufficient to cause the specific injury.”  Bramble Bush, supra note 299, at 
1037. 
314 A weakness of the but-for test is that it often results in scenarios where no causation is 
found even though a particular tortious act was a cause of a specific injury.  Two types of 
scenarios are termed preemptive causation and duplicative causation.  An example of 
preemptive causation is if D shoots and kills P just as P was about to drink a cup of tea 
poisoned by C.  D would not be liable for P’s death because P would have died from the 
poisoned tea in the absence of D’s act.  The but-for test assigns causation “if and only if” 
the injury (death, in this case) would not have occurred “but for” the tortious act.  In 
duplicative causation scenarios, if C and D independently start separate fires, each 
sufficient to destroy P’s house; and the fires converge together and burn down the house, 
neither C nor D would he held liable because the other’s fire could have destroyed the 
house.  Duplicative causation scenarios are particularly relevant to the educational 
context where many factors are potential causes of a bad outcome.  Causation in Tort 
Law, supra note 303, at 1775. 
315 John G. Culhane, Tort, Compensation, and Two Kinds of Justice, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1027, 1033 (2003). 
316 Id. at 1070. 
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The intangible and collaborative nature of the educational process makes 
computing damages difficult.  How do you determine the financial harm 
done to a student who enrolled based on an admissions officer’s tortious 
deception, had access to courses, but failed to complete the program?  
What if the student earns the credential, but finds that the market demand 
for it is much less robust than the admissions officer tortiously 
represented?  On one end, the current practice of foreclosing recovery 
results in the complete under-compensation of plaintiffs.  But on the other 
end, full reimbursement of expenses would likely amount to 
overcompensation.317  Short of absolute deprivation, it is difficult to 
determine in financial terms the difference between the educational 
experience promised and the educational experience obtained.  But 
difficulty should not be confused with impossibility, and the prospect of 
imprecision should not be allowed to leave victims without paths to 
redressing their harms. 
 
1. Determining Education Value 
 
In order to determine damages caused by negligent educational 
recruitment, a value would be assigned to the education that the victim 
actually received.  Courts have been reluctant to engage in this exercise.  
In dismissing the suit against NYLS, the court stated the following: 
 
Plaintiff’s theory of damages, that is, an award of the difference 
between what they paid for their law degree and an amount 
representing its ostensibly lesser intrinsic worth…is entirely too 
speculative and remote to be quantified as a remedy under the 
law.318 
 
This reluctance fits the theme of hostility many courts have shown when 
asked to consider the actual value of education.  But the hostility is largely 
misplaced.  The lack of absolute certainty is not an automatic bar to an 
award of damages.  Courts often award damages based on assumptions 
and valuations that are less than concrete.319 
 
The plaintiffs suing NYLS sought “restitution and disgorgement of all 
tuition monies remitted to NYLS.”320  But given that the plaintiffs left 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 Even in incidences where students are induced to enroll based on tortious conduct, the 
student nonetheless had access to the educational product and has potentially benefited 
from that exposure.  Complete reimbursement would seem appropriate only in instances 
of complete failure to deliver the educational product. 
318 Gomez-Jiminez et al., No. 2012-08819, slip op. at 20. 
319 See, e.g., Patrick G. Dunleavy, Lost Profits Calculations, Leaders’ Edge: The 
Newsletter of the Michigan Assoc. of Certified Public Accountants (2006), 
http://leadersedge.michcpa.org/JulAug06/interest-lostprofits.asp (describing how the 
process of calculating lost profits is based on forecasts and assumptions).   
320 Gomez-Jiminez et al., No. 2012-08819, slip op. at 12. 
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NYLS with a credential that allowed each of them to qualify for bar 
admission,321 such a prayer for relief is excessive.  A better theory of 
damages would have acknowledged that the education the plaintiffs 
received had some value, even if less than what was promised.  In a 
compensatory system of justice, overcompensation is no better than under-
compensation.   
 
So in order to ensure that plaintiffs are compensated for damages arising 
from negligent educational recruitment, a proxy for educational value 
needs to be identified.  The most useful proxy would be the least 
expensive tuition rate among a pool of comparable programs.  Any tuition 
(and fees) paid above this baseline would represent the plaintiff’s 
damages. 
 
The tuition charged by schools is the result of a range of strategic 
considerations.  Schools consider their own costs, student demand, as well 
as tuition charged by competitor schools.  Therefore, tuition rates, by their 
very nature, are measures of market value, in much of the same way as 
automobile sticker prices.  Additionally, it is a safe to assume that most 
students seek out educational value—the best education possible for the 
lowest price possible—when choosing among programs.  Therefore, using 
the lowest price among a pool of comparable programs serves as a useful, 
though admittedly imperfect, proxy for educational value. 
 
Price differences among comparable programs can be very significant, 
especially when for-profit schools are compared to public institutions.  
The Senate investigation found the following examples: 
 
The Medical Assistant diploma program at Corinthian’s Heald 
College in Fresno, CA, costs $22,275.  A comparable program at 
Fresno City College costs $1,650.  An Associate degree in paralegal 
studies at Corinthian-Owned Everest College in Ontario, CA, costs 
$41,149, compared to $2,392 for the same degree at Santa Ana 
College.  Everest College charges $82,280 for a Bachelor’s Degree in 
Business.  The same degree is available at the University of California 
– Irvine for $55,880.322  
 
Using the above findings, a student who was induced by tortious behavior 
to enroll in Everest’s paralegal associate’s degree program could qualify 
for up to $38,757 in damages—the difference between Everest and the 
presumably lowest priced Santa Ana College.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 Of the nine named plaintiffs, six were members of the NY bar and two were awaiting 
membership.  The remaining plaintiff was a member of the Louisiana bar and also 
awaiting membership to the NY bar.  Id. at 2. 
322 HELP REPORT, supra note 8, at 385. 
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2. Determining Pool of Comparable Programs 
 
A critical aspect of this process would be determining the programs that 
will make up the pool from which the proxy will be determined.  The 
composition of the pool would likely be a topic of contention between the 
parties, with the trier of fact making the final determination.  The approach 
to determining the pool of programs would be different based on the 
selectivity of the program that is the focus of the lawsuit.  In cases where 
the plaintiff was place-bound and applied to nonselective programs,323 all 
comparable nonselective programs within a certain determined radius (e.g. 
20 miles) of the plaintiff’s home would make up the pool, even if the 
plaintiff did not apply to all of them.  In cases where a plaintiff enrolled in 
an online program, all comparable online programs offered within the 
plaintiff’s state of residence could make up the pool. 
 
This approach is based on a presumption that place-bound students who 
attend nonselective programs could have just as easily attended another, 
comparable program in the area.  The defendant could rebut this 
presumption by showing that a particular program was not a practical 
option for the plaintiff, due to its scheduling format, course delivery 
method, or some other issue that would have prevented the plaintiff from 
attending.  A plaintiff could also attempt to add programs to the pool by 
showing that she applied and gained admission.  Such efforts could pertain 
to adding programs outside of the radius or programs with different course 
delivery methods than the one in which the plaintiff enrolled.  The focus 
of all these efforts would be on the lowest-priced programs.  Plaintiffs 
would seek to lower the proxy tuition rate, while defendants would seek to 
raise it. 
 
In cases where a plaintiff enrolled in a selective program, the pool would 
be determined based on where the plaintiff applied and gained admission.  
The basis for this approach is that a selective program cannot be 
considered “comparable” if admission was impossible, either because the 
plaintiff did not apply or because the school denied the plaintiff’s 
admission.  For example, for each plaintiff in the NYLS case, the proxy 
for the value of the NYLS education would have been the lowest priced 
law school to which the plaintiff gained admission. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323 The College Board classifies schools based on four levels of selectivity: Very 
Selective, Selective, Somewhat Selective, and Nonselective.  The classifications apply 
only to undergraduate academic programs.  For some programs, it would be necessary to 
assess the school’s admission rate and the nature of its admission process to determine 
whether it is selective.  MICHAEL HURWITZ ET AL., THE ROLE OF HIGH SCHOOLS IN 
STUDENTS’ POSTSECONDARY CHOICES 4 (2012) 
http://advocacy.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/research-role-high-schools-students-
postsecondary-choices.pdf (explaining the classifications).       
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Once the pool of comparable programs is determined and the lowest 
priced proxy is identified, the process of determining damages would 
entail simply calculating the difference between the tuition paid at the 
institution attended from the tuition at the lowest priced institutions in the 
pool.  Fee differences would be added to the total, though books and other 
expenses would not.  Scholarships, grants, and other financial aid that does 




Creating a tort path to financial recovery could fundamentally change the 
manner in which many admissions officers approach their work and the 
manner in which institutions promote themselves.  Put simply, this new 
path to redress could change the business of higher education.  Such 
changes would inevitably come with concerns and potential downsides. 
 
The principal concern relates to the potentially limited extent to which 
plaintiffs would be able to retain legal representation.  Generally, plaintiffs 
with the strongest cases would have dropped out of their programs 
relatively soon after being induced to enroll by the tortious conduct.  
Therefore, the extent of their damages would be limited.  As a result, 
many lawyers would be reluctant to expend time and energy taking on 
these cases without requiring plaintiffs to pay fees upfront.   
 
In order to remedy this concern, the award of attorney’s fees would be 
very important.  This would incentivize lawyers to take cases on behalf of 
plaintiffs unable to pay legal fees—a population arguably most likely to be 
victimized.  Absent a potential award of attorney’s fees, plaintiffs could 
bring actions in small claims court, though the process of gathering 
evidence may be formidable for many pro se plaintiffs.  Class actions 
could also make these cases financially worthwhile. 
 
Paradoxically, critics might argue that the proposed torts would prompt 
disgruntled students to inundate schools with frivolous cases.  This 
criticism would be overblown.  These cases would not be easy to prove.  
Plaintiffs would carry burdens of proving tortious behavior and causation.  
It stands to reason that given these evidentiary burdens and relatively 
small damages, few lawyers would agree to bring frivolous cases. 
 
Critics might also assert that the scope of tortious behaviors limits the 
constitutional rights of schools to promote themselves and their programs.  
This criticism would be misplaced, as the proposed torts would only 
restrict false, baseless, and misleading assertions and other unscrupulous 
behavior. 
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Finally, critics might argue that schools would be reluctant to enroll 
marginal or at-risk students out of fear that they would present lawsuits 
risks.  A simple retort would be that there will always be higher education 
options for students with financial aid eligibility.  But if the empowering 
of victims of recruitment deception prompted schools to consider their 
programs and services in light of a prospective student’s needs and goals, 
or better yet, if schools were prompted to actually adapt their programs 





Admissions officers are counselors, not used car salespeople.  Therefore, 
the use of certain sales and recruitment tactics should be considered 
tortious in the higher education context.  Providing a path to redress 
through tort law would disincentivize these unscrupulous tactics and, in 
the process, help protect students from a higher education sucker sale.   
